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THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP*
1930-1945
The ChineseCommunists,
By HENRY G. SCHWARZ*
INTRODUCTION

THE

ofstatepowerbythe
oftheassumption
anniversary
twentieth

ChineseCommunists
occasionto take stockof the
is a convenient
many dramaticeventsthat have takenplace since that firstday in
Octoberof 1949, when Mao Tse-tungproclaimedthe new People's
however,is more than a fortuiRepublicof China. The anniversary,
It lies close to one of thoseconcalendar.
tousproductof theWestern
vulsiveperiodsthat have jolted China fromtime to time and have
causedmajorchangesin theChinesestateand society.The creationof
thePeople'sRepublictwentyyearsago was one suchperiod.The Great
Leap Forwardof the late fiftieswas another,and the recentGreat
CulturalRevolutionmayhave been a third.Each of these
Proletarian
reshapedthe stateor societyor both.From
eventshas substantially
a historicalpointof view,the nextmajor eventthatmay well come
is the deathof Mao Tse-tung
anniversary
shortlyafterthe twentieth
thereand otherco-founders
of theCommuniststate.This anniversary,
to reassesstherecordof the ChineseComfore,offersan opportunity
the settingand
munistssince1949 witha view towardunderstanding
theproblemsthatthepost-Maoleadershipwill soon inherit.
of
Such a taskcannotbe complete,however,withouta reassessment
thenatureof leaderthenatureof leadership.Indeed,withoutstudying
muchelseof a totalitarian
systemwherein
ship,we cannotunderstand
and extheoryand practicethePartyleadershipis boththeoriginator
ecutorof changesin all major aspectsof the world'smostpopulous
country.
Perhapsthe mostimportantamong the leadership'smanyfacetsis
therelationsamongthehandfulof men who untilat leastthecultural
beforewe
revolutionhave governedCommunistChina. Specifically,
of
relative
influence
can understandChina we mustunderstandthe
ofChina's
process.As to theidentity
eachofthesemenin thegoverning
from
leadership,an almostlimitlesschoiceis open to the researcher,
the entiremembershipof the CommunistPartyto one man. This
studydesignatesthe Political Bureau as the leadershipalthougha
* This paper was firstpresented at the Seventh International Conference on World
Politics,Noordwijk, The Netherlands, August 31-September6, i969.
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political
evenofa highlystructured
studyof thenatureofleadership
Chinamayat timeshavetoincludeleaders
system
suchas Communist
of thePoliticalBureau.Suchmethodological
who are notmembers
leadin anystudyoftheCommunist
is evenmorenecessary
flexibility
in
flux.
and
more
structured
ershipbeforei949, whenit was less
yearsofstatepowerandalmost
is,after
twenty
as itcertainly
Strange
nota single
Party,
of theChineseCommunist
fifty
yearsof existence
subject.The
on thisvitallyimportant
has beenwritten
monograph
is
to studythenatureof leadership
onlybookwhosetitlepromises
JohnW. Lewis' Leadershipin CommunistChina.1But the title is

theactualnatureof leaderbecause,insteadof analyzing
misleading
idealsof leadership
presents
certain
ship,it ablyand comprehensively
This is notto saythatChina
as expounded
in theParty'sguidelines.
haveignored
Quiteon thecontrary,
thenatureofleadership.
specialists
everystudyof thePartyand manystudieson othersubjects
virtually
In mostcases,
of theleadership.
theirauthors'conceptions
manifest
are nottreated
in theirown right.They
theseconceptions
however,
ofsomeothersubject.
As Isaacs
arebutimagesappliedtothetreatment
and are
and othershaveshown,imagesare acquiredsubconsciously
acoutof a variety
ofhaphazardly
seldomreliable.
Theyareformed
oflifein China,bits
recollections
suchas personal
quiredexperiences,
and otherworks,
and piecesof information
acquiredfromscholarly
that
Comin othercountries areeither
relevant
observations
seemingly
or anycombination
underdeveloped
munistor Asianor economically
andmanyothers.
thereof,
havean identical
image,butwhilethereare
No twoChinaspecialists
shareonegeneral
mostChinaspecialists
image.
manyminordifferences,
It showspolicyissuesasbeingthreshed
I callthisimagequasi-collective.
manneramongthesevenmenin
outin a frankand no-holds-barred
not
in thelargerPolitical
if
theStandingCommittee,
quiteso freely
is collective,
buttheprevailing
Bureau.Suchleadership
imageaddsone
as
of Mao Tse-tung's
influence
in itsdepiction
difference,
important
Mao is envisaged
as
thanthatof his co-leaders.
considerably
greater
that
his
in
first
decision-making
powers
amongequals
beingmorethan
unencumbered
andopinbeenrelatively
havepresumably
bytheactions
and
superior
prerogatives
ionsofotherleaders.Byvirtueofexplicitly
the
Maois seenas beingabletoinfluence
ofhisownpersuasive
powers,
he and onlyhe canimpleofpolicydeliberations.
outcome
Moreover,
fromtheletter
andthespirit
mentpoliciesinwayssomewhat
divergent
1

Ithaca

i963.
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a cola crossbreed
between
In sum,theimageprojects
ofthesepolicies.
leadership.
lectiveanda fullyhierarchical
of
Onebasicshortcoming
ofthisimageis thatithandlestheconcept
majorworkofremanner.
An excellent
powerin an undifferentiating
riseto
that"Mao Tse-tung's
centyearsopenswiththeflatassertion
"power"andtosubByfailingtodissect
fact."2
poweris a well-known
havebeen
manyscholars
facetsto analysis,
interacting
jectitsmyriad
led tobelieve,
in myopinion,
that"power"willinevitably
erroneously
ofleadAn analysis
gravitate
tooneperson.
andin all political
systems
helpstobringaboutan imagethatcomesat
basedon "power,"
ership,
thattheconview.I suspect
closeto an all-or-nothing
timesperilously
disto encourage
ceptof "power,"takenas a whole,is tooimposing
section.
in relation
to
Professor
Rueprovides
ofthiseffect
clearillustrations
within
On theproblem
ofrelations
twocardinal
aspects
ofleadership.
Conthefocusofthisstudy,
Ruesaysthat"theSeventh
theleadership,
He had overofVictors.
gress[ofAprilof 1945] was Mao'sCongress
breed
concepts
Categorical
comeall hisenemies
in theChineseparty."3
morecategorical
concepts;"power"begets"enemies"and "victors."
thatof"enemy"
ofinternal
Ofthealmostinfinite
relationships,
variety
themostsharply
delineated
ofall relationis onlyonebut,admittedly,
notto nawhichin thecontext
refers
ofthesentence
ships."Victors,"
whosedefeatwas certainin Aprilof
tionalvictors
overtheJapanese,
It leavesno room
is equallycategorical.
victors,
I945, buttointra-Party
butitsantithesis,
the"vanquished."
foranything
The conceptof undifferentiated
"power"embeddedin thequasitheanalysis
control
overthe
ofleadership
collective
imagealsoaffects
Mao's
Rue statesthat"aftertheSeventhCongress,
Partyhierarchy.
control
related
factors.
Onewas
oftheparty
ontwoclosely
powerrested
theotherwasthebeliefofotherleadersoftheChineseparty
apparatus;
andthathisthought
wasthebestreplinewascorrect
thathispolitical
resentative
of Marxist-Leninist
ideologyin China."4I shallelaborate
Forthetimebeing,itwillsuffice
ofthisstatement.
lateron themerits
ofintra-leaderas in thedescription
topointoutthatMao is portrayed,
as beingmuchmorethanfirst
amongequals.He, and
shiprelations,
oftheparty
apparatus."
onlyhe,had"control
of thequasi-collective
Another
fundamental
imageis
shortcoming
oraltogether
evidence
thatis either
on documentary
itsreliance
skimpy
2John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung In Opposition, 1927-1935 (Stanfordi966),
4Ibid., 5.
3lbid., 4.
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is suppliedby
sampleof thisshortcoming
lacking.A representative
years,Mao Tse-tung
that"forthirty
who asserts
Lindbeck,
Professor
leader.Itskey
overthepartyandis itsundisputed
presided
hasfirmly
by
supported
is
statement
clearlyarehismen."Thissweeping
figures
that"almostall of
theassertion
namely,
onlyonepieceof"evidence,"
members
of theCentralCommittee
theseniormenand themajority
sharedtheLongMarchof 1934-35 withhim."5Thisviewis untenable
First,theidea of a causallinkbetween
reasons.
fortwo elementary
in the
in theLong Marchand thenatureof leadership
participation
It placesupontheLong Marchan impormid-sixties
is questionable.
ofthequoted
Second,thecontent
failstodemonstrate.
tanceLindbeck
to thePolitical
is false.If we assumethat"seniormen"refers
sentence
andsecondsessions
oftheEighthPartyConBureauelectedatthefirst
and
members
ofthetwenty-six
showsthatonlyfifteen
therecord
gress,
sharedthe Long MarchwithMao. They could
members
alternate
"almostall" ofthePoliticalBureau.Morehardlybe saidtoconstitute
suchas Who'sWhoin Comdictionary
over,a lookatanybiographical
of
reader
that
onlyaboutforty-three
China6
will
inform
the
munist
marched
members
oftheEighthCentralCommittee
theninety-seven
with Mao in

1934-35.

whenhe
LindbeckelevatesMao's positionevenfurther
Professor
that
evidence, "it has
anydocumentary
withoutoffering
maintains,
and hismen
ofvaluesanddoctrines,
hisstatement
beenhisauthority,
thepartyand builtit froma regionalband of
thathavepermeated
40,000

membersin 1937 to 17 millionin i962 and perhaps20 million

havenot
and competing
loyalties
regionalism,
by i965. Factionalism,
bythedeterbeenallowedtoemergeorhavebeenquicklysuppressed
groupthatrunstheparty."'
minedand powerful
theonslaught
hassurvived
leadership
The imageofa quasi-collective
itsreassessment.
Duringthe
ofeventsthatshouldat leasthaveelicited
heightof the GreatProletarianCulturalRevolutionin i966 and i967,

accusations
every
againstvirtually
the Mao grouphurledcountless
comThe mostimportant
implication
ofthePartyleadership.
member
last
the
that
at
no
time
was
accusations
the
all
during
almost
monto
thirty
yearswerethePartyleadersunitedin theiraimsandmotivations
did notoccupythe
andthatduringmostofthoseyearsMao Tse-tung
assumedbymanyChinaspecialists.
position
superior
5 J. M. H. Lindbeck, "Transformationsin the Chinese Communist Party," in Donald
W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Dibferences
(Seattle i967), 78.
6 Hong Kong i966.
7 Treadgold, 79.
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haveso farfailedto causemostChinaspecialists
Theserevelations
While
leadership.
theirimageofa quasi-collective
tocallintoquestion
the
since
the
Party
leadership
within
disunity
acute
acknowledging
adhere
stillseemto
mostscholars
revolution,
ofthecultural
outbreak
theirviewthatsinceat least
reaffirm
to thisimage.Someexplicitly
of statepowerin 1949, Mao Tse-tunghas beenthe
his assumption
Othersdismissrecentchargesof anti-Mao
supremedecision-maker.
andmanyother
madebytheMao groupagainstLiu Shao-ch'i
actions
runsas follows:
theirargument
leadersas ex postfacto.In essence,
at
theactionsLiu Shao-ch'iis todayaccusedof havingperpetrated
all,
at
varioustimesof his careerare,in so faras theyhad occurred
oftheMao groupbutwerein linewith
standards
bythecurrent
crimes
Partypoliciesat thetimetheyare said to havebeenmade.It does
is quitetrueas
notseemto occurto manythatwhilethisargument
responsible
ofwhohad beenchiefly
faras itgoes,itbegsthequestion
thosepolicies.
forformulating
his
is possibly
understating
thatMao Tse-tung
maintain
Stillothers
case
his
in
order
to
strengthen
in theyearspriorto i966
influence
however,
againstLiu Shao-ch'iand otherleaders.Such argument,
at present.
and whollyincapableof verification
is bothquestionable
in thismanhisopponents
toundercut
planning
If Mao wereactually
fromthepolitto gainsupport
haveexpected
ner,he mustrationally
withoutwhomstateand
and military
professionals
ical,economic,
Yet,ifthishad indeedbeenMao'smotive,
couldnotfunction.
society
ofwhathas
theopposite
exactly
hisverytacticwouldtendto support
to hispresent
it wouldgivecredibility
Putdifferently,
beenassumed.
leaderand, therefore,
claimthathe had not been the undisputed
leadoftheimageof a quasi-collective
thevalidity
wouldundermine
ership.
hisallegedly
is underplaying
somearguethatMao Tse-tung
Finally,
to draw
in
order
in
years
previous
powers
decision-making
superior
greatesteemamongthenonprofessional
fromhissupposedly
strength
whichis
LeavingasideMao'spopularity,
of thepopulation.
majority
thatan appealformass
opento doubt,we are led to theconclusion
support,as in factMao made duringthe culturalrevolution,forces

If
position.
thesisintoan untenable
of thisparticular
theproponents
leaderof the Party,he
Mao had indeedbeen the unchallengeable
ofPartyleadersthrough
the
on
overthrow
to
had
not
have
rely
would
mobviolence.
withhasalsosuccessfully
leadership
The imageofa quasi-collective
Lindbeck
Professor
fortheperiodbefore1949.
evidence
stoodcontrary
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fairlyrepresents
theopinionof manyChinaspecialists
thatMao has
heldthesupreme
position
in thePartysincethemid-thirties-since
the
TsunyiConference
in January
of I935. Professor
Lindbeck,
as quoted
earlier,
saidin i965thatMao had beenthe"undisputed
leader"ofthe
Partyforthirty
years.GeneralGriffith,
to citea secondrepresentative
sample,averredin i967-thatis, afterthe outbreakof the cultural
revolution-that
"at [theTsunyi]conference,
Mao mustered
enough
togaintheunchallengeable
support
position
whichis stillhis."8
Therecan,of course,be no doubtthattheinsurrectionary
period
in thehistory
was ofunusualsignificance
oftheChineseCommunist
movement.
Almostthirty
yearsintervened
betweenthefounding
of
thePartyin i92i and its riseto supremestatepowerin Mainland
Chinain 1949.Thisperiodwaslongerthantheinsurrectionary
periods
The Chinese
of all theotherCommunist
partiesthatnowrulestates.
fromall theothers
Partyalsodistinguishes
itself
byitslongexperience
in itsmanybaseareasbetweenI928
in thetechniques
ofgovernment
and I949.
thatthenatureof leadership
It is clear,therefore,
duringthepast
influenced
twenty
yearswas profoundly
byeventsduringa periodof
roughly
equal lengthbeforei949.As thetitleof thisstudysuggests,
I shallreassess
withintheParty'sleadership
therelationships
during
limitedto theperiodbetween1930
thatperiod.The studyis actually
In I930,
bench-marks.
and I945becausethetwodatesareconvenient
was insertedintothe Party
the Bolsheviks,
an important
element,
In 1945,theSeventh
thenatureofleadership.
altered
andsoongreatly
thathad taken
thechangesin theleadership
ratified
PartyCongress
placeduringthewar againstJapan,and it electeda new leadership
untillongafteritsassumption
of
thatremained
basicallyunchanged
I
shall
certain
in
At
statepower I949.
keypoints,
compare
representative
withtheknownfactsand
samplesof statements
by Chinaspecialists
an alternative
offer
interpretation.
of course,to present
it is impossible,
a full
In thespaceavailable,
events
relevant
between
of
all
and
treatment
chronological
I930
I945.
to whatI considerthe mostrelevant
I restrict
thisstudy,therefore,
events.
THE KIANGSI PERIOD

of the
The Kiangsiperiod(I928-I934) markedtheabandonment
in thecities.
to starta revolution
Party'salmostdecade-long
attempt
The CentralSovietAreain Southern
Kiangsi,whichwas builtprin8 Samuel B. Griffith
II, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York I967), 51.
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was the firstmajortestingcipallyby Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung,
landpoliciesundertheaegisofa fullydevelgroundforCommunist
severalcounties.
controlling
opedgovernment
was
theKiangsiperiod'schiefimportance
purposes,
For thisstudy's
thegrouparound
between
intheParty
forsupremacy
theacutestruggle
Chu Te, and otherleadersin theCentralSovietArea
Mao Tse-tung,
in Shanghai,whichbecamedominated
and the CentralCommittee
at
Theyhad beenstudents
Bolsheviks.9
Twenty-eight
bytheso-called
and most
in Moscowin themid-twenties,
theSun Yat-senUniversity
byPavelMif,
toChinain MayofI930, accompanied
ofthemreturned
Li Li-san,the
who had beentherectorof Sun Yat-senUniversity.
was removed
fromhisposition
at
oftheParty,
thengeneralsecretary
in September
of
theThirdPlenumof theSixthCentralCommittee
whowas re-elected
at
i930. His postwas givento HsiangChung-fa,
a weakleader,he
of I93I.10 Reputedly
theFourthPlenumin January
and thosewho sidedwiththem.
by Bolsheviks
becamesurrounded
members
and alternate
members
of thePolitsixteen
Besideselecting
Ch'inPang-hsien,
icalBureau,thisplenumalsoelectedCh'enShao-yii,
and K'ang Shengto the Standing
Chou En-lai,Hsiang Chung-fa,
in the
of the PoliticalBureau,the highestorganization
Committee
Chou
andtheever-adaptable
Party."Ch'enandCh'inwereBolsheviks,
influence
them.
The
Bolsheviks'
grewstill
En-laifirmly
supported
was arrested
of 193i afterHsiangChung-fa
in September
stronger
was reand Ch'enShao-yii
and executed
by thecentralgovernment
representative
calledto Moscowto becometheChineseCommunists'
filledtheirpositions,
Two Bolsheviks
ChangWenin theComintern.
Ch'inPang-hsien,
and a thirdBolshevik,
t'ienandWangYiin-ch'eng,
of theParty."2
becamethenew generalsecretary
Besides,Bolsheviks
9 Wang Chien-min lists them as follows: Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, Chang Wen-t'ien,
Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, Ch'en Shao-yii, Ch'en Yuan-tao, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chu A-ken,
Chu Tzu-hsiun, Ho Tzu-shu, Hsia Hsi, Kuo Miao-ken, Li Chu-sheng, Meng Ch'ingshu, Shen Tse-min, Sheng Ch'ung-liang, Sun Chi-min,Tu Tso-hsiang, Tu Yen, Wang
Chia-hsiang, Wang Hsiu, Wang Pao-li, Wang Sheng-jung, Wang Sheng-ti, Wang
Yuin-ch'eng,Yang Shang-k'un, Yin Chien, Yuan Chia-yung,and Yiin Yiijung. Wang
Chien-min, Chungkuo kungch'antang shihkao [A History of the Chinese Communist

Party] (Taipei I965), II, IOO.
Movement,
Withinthe ChineseCommunist
10Hsiao Tso-liang,Power Relationships
A Studyof Documents(SeattleI96I), I, II5; see also Wang, II, .
1930-34:

11 According to Ch'en Shao-yii, as quoted by Kuo Hua-lun (Warren Kuo), in
Feich'ing Yiiehpao (hereaftercalled FCYP), April I967, 95, and in Issues and Stud-

calledIS), JulyI967, 41. See also Hsiao, I, II5.
ies (hereafter
[The DisSection,Fenpenglihsi chih kungch'antang
12Kuomintang, Investigation

integrationof the Communist Party]
and in IS, OctoberI966, 46.
III-I2,

(I93I),

as quoted by Kuo in FCYP, July I966,
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took over the CentralCommittee'stwo mostimportantdepartments,
organizationand propaganda.13
Mao rankedratherlow in thePartyleadershipat thattime.In 1927,
he had been expelledfromhis positionas an alternatememberof the
the Party'sstrateProvisionalPoliticalBureauforhavingcontravened
He may
gic planswhileservingon theHunan ProvincialCommittee.14
In the followalso have been removedfromthe CentralCommittee.'5
ing year,however,when he was alreadyensconcedin the mountains
of SouthernKiangsi,theSixthPartyCongress,whichmetin Moscow,
if he had in factbeen removedin 1927) to
electedhim (or re-elected,
the CentralCommitteebut not to the PoliticalBureau.Mao had beprominentin the rapidlyexpandingstrongholdin
come sufficiently
SouthernKiangsi that in April of I930, Li Li-san, still the general
of the newly esof the Party,appointedhim as secretary
secretary
tablishedGeneralFrontCommittee(tsungch'ien wei). The officially
was to prepareand executeuprisings
statedfunctionof thiscommittee
in Hunan,Hupei, and Kiangsi.
The specificreasonwhyMao, and not someoneelse,was appointed
of theGeneralFrontCommitteewas thathe had attained
as secretary
When in Aprilof I928 he mergedthe
a majorpositionin themilitary.
fromcentralHunan
him
to
Chingkangshan
had
with
who
gone
forces
withthoseof Chu Te, the two men formedthe FourthRed Army,a
forceof about io,ooo men. Chu becameits commanderand Mao its
politicalcommissar.In Novemberof I928, a much smallerforce,estimatedat abouti,oootroopsand calledtheFifthRed Army,was formed
by P'eng Te-huainear Chu's and Mao's FourthRed Armyin Southat the end of I929 saw theFourthRed
ern Kiangsi.A reorganization
Armychangedto the FirstRed ArmyCorps with Chu and Mao reThe
tainingtheirpositionsas commanderand politicalcommissar."6
last major militaryreorganizationduring the Kiangsi period took
place in Februaryof I930, when all forcesoperatingin Southern
Kiangsi and SouthernHunan were combinedinto the First Front
Army.Once again,Chu Te was thecommanderand Mao Tse-tungthe
politicalcommissar.
Li Li-san ordereda generalattackon the cities,but when the first
13Wang, ii, 99.
"Resolution of the Political Bureau on political discipline" (November I4, I927),
5-7, translatedby Karl A. Wittfogelin his
Kuo-wen choupao, v, 3 (January I5, I928),
32-33.
ii (April-June i960),
"The Legend of 'Maoism'," China Quarterly,
15 Rue, 8i.
16The Fifth Red Army was redesignated the Third Red Army Corps, with P'eng
Te-huai remaining as commander.
14
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attackon Ch'angshaturnedinto a fiasco,Mao refusedto obey Li's
Mao did
orderfora secondattack.Despitethisblatantdisobedience,
not lose rank nor was he, as faras we know,punishedin any other
way.
theseeventsas proof
It would be a mistake,however,to interpret
thatMao had attaineda positionin thePartythatwas closetobeingunAs we have seen,Li Li-sanwas facing,in theBolsheviks,
challengeable.
far more powerfuland far more immediateoppositionthan Mao
couldhavehopedto muster.That Li did notdisciplineMao was probablydue to his attemptto ward offtheBolsheviksand to thegreatdistancebetweenthe CentralCommitteein Shanghaiand the mountain
of Kiangsiwhichwould have made anycensureineffectual.
fastness
Moreover,Mao's struggleforsupremeleadershipwithinthe Central
SovietArea was farfromover.Toward the end of I930, his position
by someleadersof thenewlyestablishedSouthwestern
was threatened
whichwas placed underthe jurisdiction
Soviet
Government,
Kiangsi
of the CentralSovietArea.17In late Novemberor earlyDecember,
Mao arrestedseveralleaderswho were suspectedof being agentsof
the A-B (Anti-Bolshevik)League, includingTuan Liang-pi,Li Pofang,and Chin Wang-pang.18
As soon as Mao had removedthischallenge,a more seriouschalKiangsi,whereon December
lengearosein Tungku in Southwestern
commissar
of
theTwentiethArmy,started
Liu
Ti, thepolitical
8, I930,
the well-knownFut'ien Rebellion. He overthrewthe Southwest
and arrestedmanyof itsleaderswhom he
KiangsiSovietgovernment
He also releasedTuan Liang-pi
suspectedof being Mao's supporters.
and theotherswhomMao had arresteda shorttimeearlier.The rebels
declaredtheirsupportforChu Te, P'eng Te-huai,and Huang Kungliieh but theyopposed Mao. Fortunatelyfor Mao, the threeleaders
Mao and censuringthe rebels.Fisupporting
issueda jointstatement
nally,therebellionwas crushedby P'eng'sThird Red Army.'9
The Third Plenumof the CentralCommitteeof Septemberof 1930,
of the
which oustedLi Li-san fromhis positionas generalsecretary
of the GeneralFrontCommittee
Party,also orderedthe replacement
17 It was established
on February7, I930. "Chianghsiti chungyangSu-ch'fi"[The
CentralSovietArea in Kiangsi],Hung-ch'ichoupao,xxiv (November27, I931), as
quotedin Hsiao, I, I70.
18 Hsiao, I, 98. The A-B League apparently
was an underground
organization
of the
in theCommunist
who
Kuomintang
areas.It was not directedagainsttheCommunists
had returnedfromthe SovietUnion and who are referredto in this studyas the
Bolsheviks.
Rather,theA-B League was aimed againstall Communists.
" See ibid.,I, 98-II3 and II, 259-83 forthe textof and commentary
on severaldocumentsconcerning
the Fut'ienRebellion.
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by a CentralBureau forthe SovietAreas (Su-ch'fichungyangchfi).
Its nine memberswere: Chou En-lai,Chu Te, Hsiang Ying, JenPishih,Mao Tse-tung,Yii Fei, Tseng Shang,and two others.Although
it appearsat firstsightthatthe leadershipof this new organization
was dilutedcomparedto theone position,held by Mao, in theGeneral
his relativepowerwas probablynot greatlyweakFrontCommittee,
was a man with
Hsiang Ying reportedly
ened by the reorganization.
few organizationalabilities.Moreover,he, Chou, Yii, and Jenmight
have been not even presentin the Kiangsi Soviet Area but in
Shanghai.20Thus, perhapsonly Tseng Shan, Chu Te, and the two
men actuallysharedpowerwithMao in Kiangsi.Indirect
unidentified
evidenceof Mao's continuedpredominancein Kiangsi,if not in the
Partyas a whole, comes froman orderissued on the day afterthe
whichexpelledfromthePartytheleadCentralBureauwas established,
Mao
ersof theFut'ienrebellion.2'By thebeginningof 1931, therefore,
and the
Tse-tunghad attainedpositionsin theParty,the government,
militaryin the CentralSovietArea that,while not unchallengeable,
were among the highest.
challenge.Justas he was strengthBut he had yetto facehis greatest
had been consolidating
the
Bolsheviks
in
eninghis influence Kiangsi,
in theCentralCommitteein Shanghai.Now theywere
theirinfluence
to theCentralSovietArea in Kiangsi.Bereadyto turntheirattention
cause of increasingpressureby Chiang Kai-shek'scentralgovernment
the
in Shanghai,the Bolsheviksdecidedto transfer
on theiractivities
PoliticalBureau to Kiangsi.Dominatingthe CentralCommitteeand
theyappearedto have theability
havingthesupportoftheComintern,
in
of
to seize thereins leadership Kiangsi.
In Septemberof I93i, eithershortlybeforeor shortlyafterthe
from Shanghai to Kiangsi, the Party
Political Bureau transferred
dictatedby Ch'in
letter."Apparently
"directive
a
Centerissued lengthy
of the Party
Pang-hsien,who had assumedthe generalsecretaryship
in
when Hsiang Chung-fawas executedby the centralgovernment
Juneof I93I, the letterseemedto attackthe leadershipof the Kiangsi
by
Sovietarea by listingseveral"grievouserrors"allegedlycommitted
Mao and otherleadersin Kiangsi.22
of a so-calledChinese
The letteralso orderedthe establishment
ibid., i, I50.
tui Fut'ien
See ibid.,I, io8, and II, 269-73 for"Chungyangchi! t'ungkaoti-er-hao:
shihpienti chiiehi"[CentralBureau CircularNote No. 2: Resolutionon the Fut'ien
incident].
tui Su-ch'5ichihshihhsin" [Directiveletterof the PartyCentralto
22 "Chungyang
the Sovietareas],in Hsiao, I, i59-62, and II, 382-89.
20

21
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SovietGovernment(Chunghua suweiai chengfu)duringa congress
scheduledforNovemberof 1931.23 This congress,the FirstAll-China
SovietCongress,openedat Juichinon November7, 193i. Toward its
closein December,thecongresselectedsixty-three
personsto the CentralExecutiveCommittee.
Mao becameitschairman,and Hsiang Ying
and Chang Kuo-t'aoitsvice-chairmen.
Directlyunderthe CentralExecutiveCommitteewas a Council of People's Commissars(jenmin
also headed by Mao, chargedwith the day-to-day
weiyfianhui),
administration
of the CentralSovietArea, i.e., the main base area in
Kiangsi.24
Mao's appointmentto the chairmanshipof the CentralExecutive
Committee
and to itsCouncilofPeople'sCommissarsmarkedthehigh
pointof his influence
duringtheKiangsiperiod.He now held leading
He was thehead of the government,
positionsin all threehierarchies.
he was thegeneralpoliticalcommissar
ofthearmedforces,and he was
a memberof the Party'sCentralCommittee.Very shortlythereafter,
however,the recentlyarrivedBolsheviksbegan systematically
to curtail his influence,
directingfirstattackagainsthis militaryposition.
Withtheonsetin Decemberof 1930 of thefirstconcertedattempts
by
to dislodgetheCommunists
thecentralgovernment
fromtheirbasesin
Kiangsi,the Communistleaders'militarypostsgrew moreimportant
and eventheirPartyposts.
thantheirgovernment
In 1932, duringthefifteen-month
pausebetweenthethirdand fourth
encirclement
campaignsagainstthe Central Soviet Area, a dispute
brokeout betweenMao Tse-tungand Chou En-Lai over the proper
Mao favoredmobileguerrillawarfareby whichhe
defensivestrategy.
would lure the enemy deep into the Communistterritory,
where
numerically
vastlysuperiorCommunisttroopscould isolateand attack
of government
had been used
small contingents
troops.This strategy
againstthefirstthreeencirclement
campaigns,but Chou En-lai,speakPoliticalBureau,had
of the Bolshevik-dominated
ing as a secretary
orderedit discontinued,
possiblybecause of the growingdisaffection
among the civilianpopulationin the Central Soviet Area. Mobile
guerrillawarfareexposed the civiliansnot only to destructionof
but also to retaliationby government
property
troops,and theirsense
23 Ibid.
24 Hsiao, I, I73.

as follows:
There werenine commissariats,

Foreign Affairs:Wang Chia-hsiang
Labor: Hsiang Ying
Land: Chang T'ing-ch'eng
Internal Affairs:Chou I-li

Military: Chu Te
Finance: Teng Tse-hui
Education: Ch'M Ch'iu-pai
Judicial: Chang Kuo-t'ao

Worker-PeasantInvestigation: Ho Shu-heng. See Wang,

II,

286.
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ofinsecurity,
as wellas dissatisfaction
withotherCommunist
policies,
resulted
in diminished
cooperation
and increased
difficulty
in recruiting.Possibly
to restore
thecivilians'morale,Chou En-laiadvocated
positional
warfare
("tokeeptheenemybeyond
thegates")anda strategyof carrying
thefightintoenemyterritory.
In his view,guerrilla
warfare
stillhad its usefulness
but it was to be wagedonlybehind
enemylines.
The clashbetweenthesetwo strategies
was brought
to a head in
Augustof1932 whenthePartyCentralcalledtheNingtuConference,
whichwas an enlarged
meeting
oftheCentralBureaufortheSoviet
Areas.Chou En-lai'sstrategy,
whichthe Bolsheviks
advocated,
won
out,andMao wasremoved
fromtheMilitary
Affairs
Committee.
After
theconference,
hisinfluence
beganto wanerapidly.BothHsiao and
Ch'encitesourcessayingthatMao becameinactivedue to actualor
politicalillnessand thatChou En-laibecamethe de factopolitical
leaderin thearmedforces.25
Chou'snew positionwas confirmed
on
when
he
was formally
to Mao'stwopostsas
May8, 1933,
appointed
of all armedforcesand as politicalcomgeneralpoliticalcommissar
Mao'sguerrilla
missaroftheFirstFrontArmy.26
strategy
and,byimin
were
further
attacked
Mao himself,
plication,
Februaryof 1933
oftheParty's
whenLo Ming,theactingsecretary
Provincial
Commitcriticized
theParty's
teein Fukien,was severely
byCh'inPang-hsien,
forapplyingMao's strategy.
Closerto home,
new generalsecretary,
attacked
whenthecampaignagainsttheso-called
Mao was indirectly
Mao Tse-t'anand Teng
Lo Minglinewas wagedagainsthisbrother,
oftheParty'sKiangsicommittee.27
thesecretary
Hsiao-p'ing,
When the centralgovernment's
Nineteenth
RouteArmy,under
Ch'en Ming-shu,
in
preparedto rebelin Fukien,the Communists
25
Ch'ihfei fantung wenchien huipien [Collection of Communist Reactionary Docuand Ku Kuan-chiao, Sanshih-nien lai ti Chungments], II, 449-50,in Hsiao, I, 2IO-II;
kung [Thirty Years of the Chinese Communists], 76, in JeromeCh'en, Mao and the
Chinese Revolution (New York i967), I76. Ch'en also cites pages 220-2I in Hsiao, but
thisis incorrect.He may have meant pages 210-I I, in which case it would have been more
helpful to cite, as Hsiao does, the original source. It should be noted, however, that
during the fifthencirclementcampaign in I934, the leadership had second thoughts
about the strategyof positional warfare,but it was too late for any change because the
initiative had already shifted to the central government troops.
Hatano Ken'ichi, Chfigoku Ay6sant6shi [History of the Chinese
26 Hsiao,
I, 220;
Communist Party] (Tokyo i96i), IV, 27i and chart at end of volume.
27 "Mao Tse-t'an t'ungchih ti San-kuochihje" [Comrade Mao Tse-t'an's enthusiasm
for the Romance of Three Kingdoms], Hung-se Chunghua, xcii (July 8, I933) and
Ch'en Shou-ch'ang, "Wei chiach'iang tang tui koming chancheng ti lingtao erh
toucheng" [Fight for strengtheningthe Party's leadership in the revolutionarywar],
Toucheng, xvi (July I5, I933), cited by Kuo in FCYP, April I967, 98-99, and IS, July

I967,

48-49.
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Kiangsiconcludedan agreementwithCh'en on October26, 1933. On
December5, however,theParty'sCentralCommittee,
underthe dominationof the Bolsheviks,
denouncedtherebelsin Fukien.28Although
Mao Tse-tungand Chu Te allegedlywantedto maintainrelationswith
the rebels,Mao's influencein the Partyhad alreadyreachedsuch a
low level thathis pleas went unheeded.29
Mao Tse-tung'sinfluencealso waned in the Partyafterthe Ningtu
Conference.Until Novemberof 1927 an alternatememberof the
PoliticalBureau,and laterappointedas secretary
of the GeneralFront
Mao was unableto finda place on thenine-manSecretariat
Committee,
that was electedat the FifthPlenum of the CentralCommitteeat
Juichinin January
of 1934. The Bolshevikscontinuedto dominatethe
Secretariat,
whose memberswere Chang Wen-t'ien,Ch'en Shao-yii,
Ch'in Pang-hsien,
Chou En-lai,Hsiang Ying,Liang Pai-t'ai,Liu Shaoch'i, Wang Chia-hsiang,and Wu Liang-p'ing.Ch'in Pang-hsienreof the Party.30
mainedthe generalsecretary
Mao was excludedfromthe PoliticalBureau
Even moreimportant,
and hencefromthe leadershipof the Partyas definedin thisstudy.
The PoliticalBureau,as electedat the FifthPlenum,is reportedto
have consistedof these fourteenmembersand alternatemembers:
Chang Kuo-t'ao,Chang Wen-t'ien,Ch'en Shao-yii,Ch'en Yiun,Ch'in
Pang-hsien,Chou En-lai,Chu Te, Ho K'o-ch'iian,Hsiang Ying, Jen
and Wang ChiaPi-shih,K'ang Sheng,Ku Tso-lin,Kuan Hsiang-ying,
hsiang.3'
28 "Chungkuo kungch'antang chungyang weiyiianhui wei Fuchien shihpien kao
ch'iian-kuo minchung" [Statement of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the people of the entire country on the Fukien incident], cited in
Hsiao, I, 249 and II, 676. A photocopyof the eleven-pointagreement,entitled "Fan-Jih
fan-Chiang ti ch'upu hsiehting" [PreliminaryAgreement Against Japan and Chiang]
is in Hsiao, II, 676. In a recent article,JeromeCh'en erroneouslylists November 26 as
the date of the agreement.See JeromeCh'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference,"
The China Quarterly,XL (October-December i969), 28. I received this article two days
before submittingmy manuscriptfor publication and, therefore,did not have sufficient
time to commentmore fullyon Ch'en's article. A few remarkshere and in other footnotes must suffice.
29 Many years later, Mao blamed the Bolsheviks for breaking off relations with the
rebels in Fukien. He explicitlyblamed the action for the collapse of the Central Soviet
Area in an interview with Edgar Snow in I936. See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over
China (New York I938), i86. He implied the same in "Kuanyfi jokan lishih went'i
ti chiiehi" [Resolution on some historicalproblems] in Mao Tse-tunghsianchi (Peking
i964), III, 955-Io02, and in SelectedWorksofMao Tse-tung(Peking i965), III, I77-225.
30Wang, II, 520. Brandt,Schwartz, and Fairbank (p. 38), and Robert North (p. i64)
quoting Chang Kuo-t'ao, say that Chang Wen-t'ien replaced Ch'in Pang-hsien at this
plenum. See Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese
Communism(Cambridge, Mass. I952) and Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese
Communists (Stanford, 2nd ed. i963). The evidence available to me convinces me
that this did not occur until the Tsunyi Conference a year later.
31 Kuo, in FCYP, Julyi967, io6, and IS, October i967, 38. The Standing Committee
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theleastimportant
of
Mao lostinfluence
evenin thegovernment,
the threehierarchies.
On February
3, 1934, duringthe SecondAllChinaSovietCongress,
as chairman
heldin Juichin,
he was re-elected
of theCentralExecutive
Committee
of theChineseSovietRepublic,
a Bolshevik,
as chairman
of
buthe wasreplaced
byChangWen-t'ien,
whenMao had been
theCouncilofPeople'sCommissars.32
Moreover,
electedas chairman
Committee
at theFirst
of theCentralExecutive
All-ChinaSovietCongress,
he had had to sharehis governmental
ChangKuo-t'aoand Hsiang
powersonlywithhistwovice-chairmen,
othermen,
Ying.Now, in additionto thesametwo men,fourteen
a so-called
wereelectedas "the
composing
Presidium
(chuhsi-t'uan),
supreme
organofpolitical
power."33
months
ofsummer
and earlyfallof 1934, when
Duringthefateful
fifthencirclement
campaigninexorably
the centralgovernment's
thenoosearoundthe CentralSovietArea,Mao Tse-tung
tightened
wherethedecisionhad to be
appearedto be removed
frompositions
to Kung Ch'u,the
madeto tryto escapetheclosingtrap.According
and ChangKuo-t'ao,in
oftheCentralMilitary
District,
chiefofstaff
to theParty'sdenunciation
consequence
of Mao's allegedopposition
in Fukien,he wasputon probation
as a Partymember
oftherebellion
byan orderfromMoscow.KungsaysthatMao was deniedaccessto
and thathe did nottakepartin thedecisionon
all Partymeetings
SovietAreaandtobeginwhatbecame
theCentral
October
2 toabandon
knownas theLong March.ChangbelievesthatMao had been deon theeveoftheLongMarch.34
all authority
privedofvirtually
We do nothaveconclusive
proofthatKung'sandChang'sassertions
evidencethattheymightbe. It is
but thereis indirect
are correct,
Mao was notevenin
knownthatforsometimeduringthatsummer,
werelocatedand where
whereall important
Juichin,
organizations
all top decisionsweremade.Ch'uanLien-chang
saysin his article
Mao in Yiitu]thatMao suffered
"Mao chuhsitsaiYiitu"[Chairman
in Yiitu,a townsome
frommalariaandspentsometimein September
AnotherCommunist
sourcesaysthat
mileswestof Juichin.35
fifty
of1934, thathe leftforKaopinao
Mao wasinYiituduringthesummer
of the Political Bureau consisted of Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yiin, ch'in Pang-hsien,
Chou En-lai, and Hsiang Ying. Kuo, ibid.
32 "Chung-hua suweiai kunghokuo chungyang chihhsingweiyuianhuipukao, ti-i-hao"
[Proclamation of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic,
No. I], cited in Hsiao, I, 280-8I and II, 762.
cited by Kuo in FCYP, July
33Hung-se Chunghua, No. I48 (February I2, I934),
I967, II4 and IS, October I967, 52.
34 Hsiao, I, 296-97.
35Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao [The Red Flag Flutters] (Peking I959),
x, 3.
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nearJuichin,
"wherehe wasverybusy,callingmeetings
oftheresponsiblecadresin thelocalities
he visitedor makinginvestigations
in the
villages,"
thathe returned
to Yfituat theendof September,
and that
he thendeparted
fromthereon theLongMarchon Octoberio."3
version
was toldto NymWalesin I937 byHsii MengA different
ch'iu,whosaidthatMao wentbriefly,
in lateSeptember,
presumably
inthedecision
toJuichin,
whereheparticipated
toevacuate
theCentral
to Hsi!, the decisionwas reachedby some
SovietArea. According
councilcomposedof Chou En-lai,Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng,
military
andtheComintern
Mao Tse-tung,
WangChia-hsiang,
military
adviser
Li Te.37This council,probably
ad hoc,was notthesame
constituted
as theParty's
sometimes
Revolutionary
Military
Committee,
translated
as Council.
In the lightof the failureof two publications
thatunreservedly
praiseMao to mention
his allegedrolein thedecisionof October2,
I934, I findHsi's assertion
unconvincing.3
At anyrate,evenif we
thatmeeting,
assumethatMao had attended
hisinfluence
withinthe
wouldhavebeensmall.Had Mao actually
leadership
beenpermitted
toattend
themeeting,
itwouldhavebeensolelybyvirtue
ofhistitular
Executive
chairmanship
oftheCentral
Committee
oftheChineseSoviet
Republic.
On theeveoftheLongMarch,all decisive
political
military
wereoccupiedbyotherleaders.Theywere:
positions
Affairs
Chairman
oftheParty's
Military
Chou En-lai
Committee:
of
Protection
Director theNationalPolitical
Office:
TengFa
FirstFrontArmy:
ChuTe
Commander
Commissar
Chou En-lai
Political
ChiefofStaff
Liu Po-ch'eng
(formerly
Yeh Chien-ying)
ofPoliticalDepartment
Director
WangChia-hsiang
District:
Central
Military
Commander
HsiangYing
36Ch'en Chang-feng,
On The Long March With Chairman Mao (Peking i959), i9.
37Nym Wales, Red Dust: Autobiographiesof Chinese Communists (Stanford i952),

67.

was one of the Bolshevikswho by I937 had lostmuch of their
38 Hsfi Meng-ch'iu
interviewer
formerinfluence.By tellingan unsuspecting
thatMao took part in the
himselfwithMao.
decision,he may have been tryingto ingratiate
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PoliticalCommissar
Chiefof Staff
Directorof PoliticalDepartment
DirectorofBranchOffice
oftheNational
PoliticalProtectionOffice

Hsiang Ying
Kung Ch'u
Ch'en I
T'an Chen-lin39

In sum,Mao was not a memberof the politicalleadership,which
was in the hands of the Bolsheviks,nor of the militaryleadership.
Moreover,althoughhe nominallyretainedthe chairmanshipof the
CentralExecutiveCommitteeof the Chinese Soviet Republic,that
post actuallyceased to exist when the Communistsabandoned the
CentralSovietArea. As far as we know,no changein the political
and militaryleadershiptook place until the Tsunyi Conferencein
January
of I935.
THE LONG MARCHES

Afterthe FirstFrontArmyoccupiedTsunyi on January5, I935,
of the Politthe CentralCommitteeconvenedan enlargedconference
ical Bureauon January6 through8. The standardpost-i949 Commuas expressedby Ho Kanof theTsunyiConference,
nistinterpretation
were removedfromtheir
chih,has been that"the 'Left' opportunists
leadingpositionsand a new Partyleadershipheadedby ComradeMao
the CommuLike manyChina specialists,
Tse-tungwas established."
nistssee the TsunyiConferenceas theturningpointin the historyof
the CommunistParty,or,as Ho put it,"the beginningof a new leadershipin the CentralCommitteeheaded by ComradeMao Tse-tung
in theParty."4
was a changeof paramounthistoricalimportance
The known factsdo not supportsuch a sweepingassertion.Two
and the decisions
cardinalpointsmustbe considered:the participants
of whom sevenoftheconference.
Perhapstwentyleadersparticipated,
teenhave beenidentified
by Kuo Hua-lun.They are said to be Chang
Ch'in Pang-hsien
Wen-t'ien(Lo Fu), Ch'en Yfin,generalsecretary
(Po Ku), Chou En-lai,Chu Te, Ho K'o-ch'iian(K'ai Feng) Li Fuch'un,Li Wei-han(Lo Mai), Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng,Liu Shao-ch'i,
Mao Tse-tung,Nieh Jung-chen,
P'eng Te-huai,Teng Fa, Wang ShouAlthoughthisis themostextensiveavailtao,and Yang Shang-k'un.4'
39Wang,II, 622; HsiiehYiieh, Chiao-feichishih [Recordof Encirclingthe Communists](Taipei i962), tablebetweenpages I4 and I5; Kung Ch'u, Wo yii Hung-ehiin
[The Red Army and I] (Hong Kong I954), 405-6.
40
41

Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution (Peking I959), 265.
Kuo, in FCYP, September i967, 99, and in IS, Januaryi968, 44. Also present at

adviserLi Te (OttoBraun,alias Albertand Wagner)
was theComintern
theconference
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it is admittedly
at theTsunyiConference,
ablelistoftheparticipants
is
A seconddifficulty
notfreefromerror.
and possibly
notcomplete,
ofthePolitroster
ofmembers
bytheabsenceofanycomplete
created
therewereaboutthirteen
icalBureau.42
To thebestofmyknowledge,
members.
at Tsunyi,sevenwere
as participants
OfthosewhomKuo identified
Ch'en Yiin,
Wen-t'ien,
PoliticalBureaumembers:Chang
probably
and Li
Chou En-lai,Li Wei-han,Liu Shao-ch'i,
Ch'inPang-hsien,
menwereimportant
leaders
tenidentified
Nineoftheother
Fu-ch'un.43
who heldno
and theonlyparticipant
in thePartyand themilitary,
It may
was Mao Tse-tung."
leadingpostsin thePartyor themilitary
at
thathis inclusionin the deliberations
therefore,
be speculated,
ofthe
Tsunyiwasbasedon hisbythenpurelynominalchairmanship
on an invitation
byone
ChineseSovietRepublicand,possibly,
defunct
ormorePoliticalBureaumembers.
otherleaders,
is thatfourteen
however,
Whatis ofequalsignificance,
fiveprobable
to thosecitedaboveand including
equalin importance
in thatconference,
didnotparticipate
ofthePolitical
members
Bureau,
and othermilitary
subjects.45
whosepurposewas to discussstrategy
that
the
to
generalpoliticalline was
Thereis no evidence suggest
overtheconference,
presided
placedon theagenda.Ch'inPang-hsien
and Wu Hsiu-ch'iian, his interpreter.See "Irrefutableevidence of crime of Wu Hsiuch'iian's betrayal of the Party and the country,"Hung-wei Chan-pao, April I3, i967;
translatedin U.S. Consulate-General,Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No.
4007

(August23,

i967),

4.

Although Hatano lists eleven members in one of his charts, I am inclined to
think that membershipin the Political Bureau at that time is not preciselyknown. See
Hatano, v, chart at end of volume.
43 Kuo may be in error when he lists the last three men as either members or alternate membersof the Central Committee.Kuo, ibid. Ch'en, in "Resolutionsof the Tsunyi
Conference,"i9, says that "Liu Shao-ch'i by all accounts did not take part in the Long
March." (Italics added.) I can thinkoffhandof one source that states that Liu did take
part: Chingkangshan Fighting Corps of the Fourth Hospital, Peking, "A Chronicle of
Events in the Life of Liu Shao-ch'i" (May i967), translatedin U.S. Consulate-General,
Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 834 (August i7, i967), 3. In the absence of
evidence, we must assume that this source is as reliable or unreliable
incontrovertible
as other sources. The crux of my argument rests with the highly unstable situation at
Tsunyi. Leaders came and went throughouttheir stay in the Tsunyi area; hence it is
probable that differentlists of participants may all be partly right, depending on
when the various eyewitnesseswere at or near the conferencesite.
44They were: Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho K'o-ch'iian, P'eng Te-huai, Yank Shangk'un, Lin Piao, Nieh Jung-chen,Wang Shou-t'ao, Li Wei-han, and Teng Fa.
45 The Political Bureau memberswere Ch'en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), Chang Kuo-t'ao,
jen Pi-shih,Hsiang Ying, and Wang Chia-hsiang. Three importantleaders who were
with the First Front Army but are not known to have attended the conferencewere
Yeh Chien-ying,Tung Chen-t'ang,and Lo P'ing-hui; and six who unquestionably did
not participatewere Ho Lung, Hsii Hsiang-ch'ien, Hsiao K'o, Wang Chen, Ch'en I,
and Kung Ch'u.
42
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and Chou En-lai, P'eng Te-huai,Mao Tse-tung,and Liu Shao-ch'i
and perhapsotherleaderspresentedreports.Chou, in his capacityas
read the militaryreport
chairmanof the MilitaryAffairsCommittee,
of past military
aspects
various
criticized
and threeotherspeakers
strategy.P'eng, commanderof the Third Army Corps, denounced
whichhe blamed
and slowmovement,
desertion,
wholesaleevacuation,
bythe Communistssincetheirexodus
fortheheavycasualtiessuffered
fromthe CentralSovietArea in Octoberof I934. Mao criticizedthe
campaignagainstthe
duringthe fifthencirclement
defensivestrategy
CentralSovietArea.Liu, thedirectoroftheParty'stradeuniondepartwhich he said emerged
ment,complainedabout "Left adventurism,"
afterthe fourthplenum of the PoliticalBureau in Januaryof I93I
of Partyorganizationsin the
and caused the virtualdisintegration
exceptin thefewCommunistbase areas.46
"White"areas,i.e.,anywhere
to notethatLiu Shao-ch'idid not supportMao's arguIt is important
mentbutratherseemedto speakhismindas an individualleaderabout
whathe consideredhad been seriouserrorsin theParty'spolicies.
also came
In theensuingdebate,theParty'spoliticalline apparently
under attack.It was, however,ably defendedby general secretary
by theconference.
werereaffirmed
and itsresolutions
Ch'in Pang-hsien
and cohesivefaction
evidencefor a well-defined
There is insufficient
misleadingto speak,as Procommandedby Mao, and it is therefore
fessorRue does, of a Maoist group.Individualleadersseemedto be
to inducetheirco-equalcomradesto supportthemin the
attempting
They did not succeed,as is
formalvoteat the end of the conference.
evidencedby the compromiseofferedby Chang Wen-t'ien.He supportedgeneralsecretaryCh'in by approvingof the Party'sgeneral
politicalline, but he blamed him, Chou En-lai, and Li Te for the
campaignand thus
defensivestrategyduringthe fifthencirclement
raisedby P'eng and Mao.
agreedwiththe criticisms
implicitly
middlepositionwon out.The conference
adopted
ChangWen-t'ien's
a documententitled"Chungyang chengchihchii k'uangta huiyi
chiiehyi:chient'aoPo Ku, Chou En-lai, Li Te t'ungchihchiinshih
luhsienti ts'owu" ["Resolutionsof the Enlarged Conferenceof the
CentralPoliticalBureau: A reviewof the errorsin the militaryline
of ComradesPo Ku, Chou En-lai,and Li Te"]. I summarizethemajor
as recollectedby one of the conferees.47
resolutions,
48 Wei K'o-wei (Carl Wei), "Tsunyihuiyi lishihchenhsiang(hsia)," [The truth
about the TsunyiConference(Part II)], in FCYP, Novemberi968, II3, and IS, Februaryi969, 24.
47 Kuo. in FCYP, September i967, ioo-oi, and IS, January
1968, 45-47. Kuo's inform-
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The dangerof China's becominga Japanesecolonywas increasing
because the Kuomintangpreventedthe Communistsfrom moving
northwardto fightthe Japanese.Proofof thiswas the fifthencirclementcampaignagainsttheCommunists
and theirousterfromtheCentralSovietArea.SincetheFourthPlenumofthePoliticalBureauin Januaryof I93I, the Partyhad, with Cominternhelp, steereda correct
path and had avoidedfactionalsplitswithinits ranks.On the other
hand, the militaryline duringthe fifthencirclement
campaigncontainedseriouserrors.The principleof not yieldingterritory
placed the
Communisttroopsin a conservative
and passiveattitude.This attitudeexpressed
itselfin unwillingness
to abandoncertainSovietpockets,
to lurethecentralgovernment
troopsdeep into Sovietterritories,
and
to launch counterattacks
into territories
held by the centralgovernment.The Communistssuffered
heavycasualtiesbecauseof thiserroneous militarystrategy.
During the evacuationof the CentralSoviet
Area, politicalmobilizationwas given up under the pretextof preservingmilitary
secretsand thisloweredthemoraleofthetroops.Moreof heavyequipment,printingpresses,and the like,
over,thetransport
sloweddown the troopsand led to further
heavylossesat the hands
of the pursuingcentralgovernment
troops.Afterreviewingand correctingthe erroneousmilitaryline of "simpledefenseand desertionism,"the Partyshouldbe able to displayits finetraditionin mobile
warfarein orderto fightforachievingtaskscurrently
it.
confronting
The conference
decidedto continuethenorthward
marchacrossthe
YangtzeRiverforthepurposeofjoiningwiththeFourthFrontArmy
commandedby Chang Kuo-t'ao.Divisionswereabolished,and officers
and companiesto strengthen
weresentdownto regiments
theircombat
efficiency.
The conference
also decidedto reorganizetheParty'sCentralCommitteeand MilitaryAffairsCommittee.Chang Wen-t'ien,who had
inducedthe confereesto adopt his compromiseresolutions,
emerged
as theleaderofthePartyby replacingCh'in Pang-hsienas the general
Ch'in was appointedas directorof theGeneralPoliticalDesecretary.
of the Red Army,withLi Wei-han(Lo Mai) as directorof
partment
sectionand Ho K'o-ch'iianas director
ofitspropaganda
itsorganization
oftheWhiteAreasworkcommittee
Ch'enYfin,thedirector
section.
who
had defendedLi Te, was orderedto go to Moscowto informtheComant, Ch'en Jan,was the directorof the centralpersonnelcorps for local work in
P'eng Te-huai'sThird Corps during the Tsunyi Conference.He went under the
pseudonymof Kuo Chien.
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and to obtainitsapprovalof theresointernof theTsunyiConference
to
lutions.His place was takenby P'an Han-nien,who was instructed
establishliaisoncentersin Hong Kong and Shanghai.
Most importantfor this study'sobjective,Mao Tse-tungreplaced
Chou En-lai as chairmanof the Party'sMilitaryAffairsCommittee.
Mao also becamea memberof the PoliticalBureau and of its Standwherehe replacedHsiang Ying, who had been left
ing Committee,
behindin theabandonedCentralSovietArea.48Thesetwoappointments
weremajor gains forMao, but theywere the onlygains thatwe can
is based
safelysay he had actuallywon at Tsunyi.The information
of theconference
by Ch'en Jan,one of theparticipants
on recollections
given
and, in my judgment,is more reliablethan the interpretations
based
by many China specialistsbecause,as shown below, theyare
vague sources.It is possieitheron no sourcesat all or on exceedingly
are faultyor thattheinformable,of course,thatCh'en'srecollections
tion givenby him and presentedby Kuo Hua-lun is wrong in any
whichin myopinionis
numberof respects.But onlytotalfabrication,
less usefuland reliable
would make Ch'en's information
improbable,
thanthe sourcesreliedupon by some China specialists.
of the TsunyiConA few representative
samplesof interpretations
ferencemustsuffice.
JohnRue and StuartSchramassert,withoutoffering any evidence,thatMao becamethe chairmanof the PoliticalBureau. Schramadds that this post was newly createdat the Tsunyi
Conference.49
Brandt,Schwartz,and Fairbankgo stillfartherand say
assumesPartyleadershipas Chairmanof [Central
that"Mao formally
Like Rue and Schram,theyofferno
Committee]and Politburo."50
Hsiao, Lewis, and Swarup
evidenceto back up theirinterpretation.
remarks,such as "Mao
make only some vague and uncorroborated
gottheupperhand of Ch'in [Pang-hsien]and achievedcontrolof the
Party"(Hsiao), "Mao becamepartyleader" (Lewis), and "the decision of the Tsunyi Conference[elevated] Mao to top leadership"
(Swarup).5' As notedearlier,JohnLindbeck says that Mao became
saysthathe attainedan
the "undisputedleader"and Samuel Griffith
also demonstrates
Griffith
conclusively
"unchallengeableposition."52
leadershipis not weakenedby the
thatthe image of a quasi-collective
absenceof supporting
evidence,forhe remarksin the verynextsen48Kuo, in FCYP, September i967, ioi, and IS, Januaryi968, 47-48.
Rue, 270; Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Baltimore i966), i82.
50 Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 38.
51 Hsiao, I59; Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement,
I927-1934 (Oxford i966), 257; Lewis, 22.
51.
52Treadgold, 78; Griffith,
49
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tencethat"tothisday,no oneoutsidethetightcircleat thetopofthe
whatwenton behindcloseddoorsat Tsunyi."53
Partyknowsprecisely
to backup hisstatewhomakesan effort
The onlyChinaspecialist
ofthePoliticalBureauis Jerome
mentthatMao becamethechairman
evidence.
forsupporting
Ch'en,54
whocitesfivesources
Unfortunately,
buttheotherfour
is notavailableto me at present,
oneofhissources
hisassertion.
One is Mrs.HelenFosterSnow,whoredo notsupport
A secondsourceCh'en
marksen passantthat"Mao achievedpower."55

polemicagainstthe
reliesheavilyon in hisworkis Ku Kuan-chiao's
thatMao made Chang
in whichKu remarks
ChineseCommunists,
his "puppet"(k'ueilei).56These two sourcesrequireno
Wen-t'ien
merely
saysthattheconHo Kan-chih,
A third,
consideration.
further
positionas leaderof
ComradeMao Tse-tung's
"established
ference
that"this
declares
Liu Po-ch'eng,
Thefourth
source,
thewholeParty."57
withComradeMao Tse-tung
. . . begana newleadership
conference
to
As in thecaseofthedecision
as theheadofthe[Party]Central."58
theCentralSovietArea,theavailablesourceslendno credievacuate
of fact,thatMao Tseas a statement
presented
bilityto theopinion,
Ho Kan-chih's
Political
Bureau.
the
chairman
of
the
became
tung
exaltatheintense
reminiscences
fullyreflect
bookandLiu Po-ch'eng's
theperiodduringwhichtheywere
tionof Mao thatcharacterized
be expectedto mentionMao's proTheycouldtherefore
published.
of thePoliticalBureau,had he indeed
motionto thechairmanship
at Tsunyi.Buttheydo not; insteadtheyindulgein
beenpromoted
vaguelanguagesuchas "leaderofthe
whatappearsto be deliberately
needofwhichterms,
the
neither
"head
of
and
Central,"
wholeParty"
in theParty.
toan actualposition
lesstosay,refers
duringtheTsunyiConfergainedstrength
In sum,twomenclearly
Bothmenhad theirviews
and Mao Tse-tung.
ence:ChangWen-t'ien
in theirParty
were
promoted
adoptedby theirpeersand bothmen
ForChang,itwastothehighest
postin theParty;forMao,
positions.
53Griffith, 5I.
54

5

Ch'en, i89.

NymWales,I4.

56 Ku Kuan-chiao, San-shih nien lai ti Chungkung [Thirty Years of the Chinese
Communists] (Hong Kong I955), 77-78. In his "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," 20, Ch'en repudiatesKu's remark but does not mention his earlier heavy reliance
on Ku. But if Ch'en drops Ku as supportingevidence, he is not inclined to reconsider
to "the election of Mao to the
his basic claim, for on p. 36 he refersmatter-of-factly
chairmanshipof the Politburo" at Tsunyi.
57 Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution (Peking i960),
265.
Ch'en incorrectlycites pages 260-70.
58 Liu Po-ch'eng,"Huiku ch'ang-cheng" [Reminiscingabout the Long March], Hsinghuo liao-yfian[A Single Spark Starts a Prairie Fire] (Peking i960), 5.
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a return
to thePoliticalBureaufromwhichhe had beenremoved
in

I927. Of the two positionsto which Mao was elected,the chairmanshipof theMilitaryAffairsCommitteewas probablythe moreimportantforthedurationof theLong March.It gave him a vantagepoint
fromwhichhe could decisivelyinfluencethe strategic
and tacticaldecisionsofat leastone bodyofCommunisttroops,theFirstFrontArmy.
In the broadestsense,the principaloutcomeof the TsunyiConference does not seemto have been the personalvictoryof Mao overhis
rivals.Rather,thechiefsignificance
of thatconference
was theascendancy of a militaryframeof mind withinthe Partyleadership.The
greathardshipsof the Long March demandedof the Chinese Communistsa degreeof attentionto militarymattersto which the old
leadership,
ensconcedin thecitiesof China until193i, had neverbeen
matters.
The man
Mao had alwayshad a penchantformilitary
obligated.
whose lifelongmottohas been "Power growsout of the barrelof a
gun" was in manyrespectsthe mostappropriate
agentforthe victory
of the militaryframeof mind at Tsunyi.This view does not imply,
of course,thatMao was somehowthe passivetool of impersonalhistoricalforces:he had, afterall, made patientand persistent
preparationsforhis comebackto the higherlevelsof Partyleadership.This
view,however,does stressthe conjunctionat the timeof the Tsunyi
of Mao's own efforts
and of the environmental
forcesthat
Conference
forsurvival.
impingedupon a partyfighting
If themilitary
exigenciesof theLong MarchenabledMao Tse-tung
to riseonceagain to thehigherlevelsof thePartyleadership,
theyalso
placed sharplimitations
on his abilityto attainan undisputedand unstatements
to this
challengeable
positionin theentireParty.Latter-day
effectseem to overlookChang Wen-t'ien,the new generalsecretary
of the Party,who was with the FirstFrontArmy.Even if Mao had
been able,thanksto his positionof chairmanof the MilitaryAffairs
Committeeand to the militarynatureof the Long March,to assert
in politicalmatters
his authority
on military
matters,
Chang'sinfluence
was notlikelytohavevanishedovernight.59
Moreover,Mao could not have acquired supremepoliticalpower
overtheentirePartyforthebasicreasonthatmanywieldersofpoliticomilitarypowerin the Partywerenot withthe FirstFrontArmybut
elsewhere.The CentralSovietArea, which the centralgovernment
59In their effortsto discount Chang Wen-t'ien's importance,some China specialists
resort to imprecise language. Stuart Schram, for example, says that although Chang
became the new general secretaryof the Party,"henceforththe real power belonged to
Mao." Schram, i82. (Italics added).
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had forcedthe FirstFrontArmyunderChu, Mao, Chou, and others
to abandon,was one of about fifteenCommunistbase areas.Two of
them,theWesternHunan-Hupei(Hsiang-O-Hsi) and Hupei-HonanTheir large military
Anhui (O-Yii-Wan), were especiallyimportant.
forcesweresecondonlyto thosein the CentralSovietArea.
The WesternHunan-Hupeibase area was controlledby the Second
FrontArmyunderthecommandof Ho Lung. It starteditsown Long

Marchon November
i9,

1935,

morethana yearlaterthantheFirst

FrontArmy,which it nevermet untilmost Communisttroopsconcentrated
in NorthernShensiin early1937. Composedoffivedivisions,

ofsome20,000 troopsin November
theSecondFrontArmyconsisted
the SecondFrontArmymetwith
of 1935. Aftermuchhard fighting,
theFourthFrontArmynear Kantze in Sikangin Juneof 1936.60
imThe FourthFrontArmy,underChang Kuo-t'ao,was extremely
to
opposition
and
for
its
leader's
portantbothforitsmuch largersize
Mao Tse-tung.Originallystationedin the Hupei-Honan-Anhuibase
was said to be around20,000,61it started
area,whereitstroopstrength
out on itsLong Marchin Decemberof 1932 and movedto theborder
betweenSzechuan and Shensi,where it restedand greatlyenlarged
its troopstrength.
By earlyspringof 1934, Chang Kuo-t'ao'sFourth
large area, with an
FrontArmyhad firmcontrolover a sufficiently
estimatedpopulationof nine million,to establisha "Szechuan-Shensi
SovietArea" withChang Kuo-t'aoas Chairman.He also presidedover
MilitaryCommittee(Hsipei
a newlycreatedNorthwestRevolutionary
to facilitatethe FirstFront
In
order
homingchfinshihweiyfianhui).
marchfromTsunyi,theFourthFrontArmyleftits
Army'snorthward
base in March of 1935 and moved westward.It is
Szechuan-Shensi
said to have had about8o,oootroopsat thattime.62

but
Reducedto about70,000 troopsas a resultof heavyfighting

again fullyrestedand well-armed,the FourthFrontArmymet the
FirstFront Army at Moukung in NorthernSzechuan on June i6,
itsoriginal
935.63 The FirstFrontArmyhad lostmuchof itsstrength,
60 Chungkuo
kung-nunghung-chfinti-i fangmien chln ch'ang-chengchi [A Record
of the Long March of the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red
Army] (Peking I958), 464-65 (hereaftercited as Chungkuo kung-nung). Ch'en's unsubstantiatedclaim that the two armies met in May is probably incorrect(p. 386).
61 "Ch'uan-Shen Su-ch'fi yii hung-ssu fangmien chuin ti chingjen shengli" [The
Szechuan-Shensi Soviet area and the Red Fourth Front Army's smashing victories],
Toucheng,LXIV (February 2I, I934), cited by Kuo in FCYP, November i967, io8, and
in IS, March i968, 38.
62
Chungkuo tung-nung, 46i.
63Ibid., 435. Ch'en, quoting Agnes Smedley and Edgar Snow, says that the Fourth
Front Army had only 50,000 troops at the time of juncture (Ch'en, I93).
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starved,
go,oootroopshavingbeenreducedto about35,oooexhausted,
ill-clad,
andpoorlyarmedtroops.
The leadersofthetwofront
a PoliticalBureauconarmiesconvened
arguedfor
ference
at nearby
Lianghok'ou
on June25.Mao andothers
to Northern
Shensi,where
joiningin a "Long March"northward
a base area,forthe
Hsii Hai-tungand Kao Kang had established
ostensible
ChangKuo-t'ao,
purposeof fighting
againsttheJapanese.
in view
was unrealistic
on theotherhand,thought
thatthisstrategy
weakenedstrength
of theCommunists.
He suggested
of thegreatly
shouldremain
inSikangandSzechuanand
thattheCommunists
instead
laterestablish
forpossibleaid,withtheSovietUnionthrough
contact,
influence
Mao had
Sinkiang.Chang may have feltthatwhatever
achieved
in theFirstFrontArmyas a resultoftheTsunyiConference
mustnotspreadto his own army.Afterall, Changhad beenMao's
whichhe, Chang,
seniorin thePartybeforetheTsunyiConference,
weresuperior
his70,000troops
hadnotattended;
and,mostimportant,
andphysical
NeitherChangnor,
to Mao'sin bothnumerical
strength.
thatMao
in all probability,
exceptMao thought
anyoftheparticipants
was,in Jerome
Ch'en'swords,"theleaderof thepartywhomChang
had to obey."64
The conference
endedin a stalemate
of
and,uponthesuggestion
Chu Te, whoactedas mediator,
thetwoarmiesdecidedto rest.They
and restedtherefromJulyio through
29.65
movedon to Maoerhkai
heldanother
to reconference
Duringthistime,thePartyleadership
at Lianghok'ou.
solvethedeadlockreachedearlier
The conferees
onceagainfailedtoagreeon a common
atMaoerhkai
a compromise
ofsorts.
The twofront
buttheydideffect
armies
strategy
weredividedso thattwocolumns,
eastandwest,mightbe formed
out
wastocommand
theeastern
ofelements
Mao Tse-tung
ofbotharmies.
column,
composed
ofhisownFirstandThirdArmyCorpsandofthe
FourthFrontArmy'sFourthand Thirtieth
Armies.ChangKuo-t'ao
columncomposed
wastocommand
thewestern
ofhisownThirty-first
and Thirty-second
Armiesand of theFirstFrontArmy'sFifthand
NinthCorps.The two columnswereroughlyequal in numerical
theenstrength,
butChanghada clearedgeoverMao.First,virtually
in chiefChu Te,
commander
tireRed Armyheadquarters,
including
wasattached
tohiscolumn.Second,soonafterMao'scolumnresumed
its northernmarch,one of its units,the ThirtiethArmy,underHsi!
Hsiang-ch'ien,lost its way and had to returnto Maoerhkaiwhereit
of Chang Kuo-t'ao'scolumn.How deep thediviadded to thestrength
64

Ch'en, I93.

65

Chungkuokung-nung,
436.
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sionbetween
ChangandMao hadbecomewas shownbythecreation
byChangofa rivalCentralCommittee
withhimself
as itshead.66
It is incontrovertible,
therefore,
thatas longas he was on theLong
March,Mao Tse-tung
had notbeenable to assumethe positionof
supreme
leadership
of thePartythatlatter-day
Chineseand Western
interpretations
givehim.It is alsotrue,however,
thatChangKuo-t'ao,
hismostseriousrival,was soonto see his military
powerdecimated
bycentral
government
troops.
Aftermovingsouthward
fromMaoerhkai,his columnsuffered
heavycasualties
in itsattempt
to establish
a
viablebasein Sikang.Aftertheyjoinedat Kantze,theSecondand
FourthFrontArmiesdecidedto movenorthward
in thedirection
of
Shensi,whereMao's FirstFrontArmyhad arrivedin November
of
1935. Butwhentheymetwithelements
of thatarmyat Huiningin
Octoberof 1936,Chang Kuo-t'aodecidednot to proceedto Northern

in thedirection
Shensibutto movewestward
of theKansuCorridor
Forthispurpose,
he regrouped
andSinkiang.67
mostofhistroopsinto
a so-calledWesternRouteArmy(Hsi-lu chuin) comprising
about
22,500

men.68

Only 700 survivorsactuallyreachedUrumchi.69
Along

witha handful
he wenttotheNorthern
ofthem,
Shensibasearea.His
chiefbargaining
powerthuslost,Changwasbrought
totrialinJanuary
ofI937 andordered
untilhehadpurged
to"study"
himself
ofhis"incorrect"ideas.In plainoperational
terms,
thetrialmeanttheendofChang
Kuo-t'aoas an activemember
A short
ofthePartyleadership.
timelater,
on April4, 1938, he leftYenan,andwhilein Wuhanhe wentoverto
theKuomintang
onApril17. He wasthenformally
ofhisParty
stripped
One smallconsequence
and of his Partymembership.70
of
positions
mention.
In
of
about
one
hunChang'strialdeserves
earlyApril 1937,
whohadbeenattending
dredofChang'sofficers
K'angTa (K'ang-Jih
chiin-cheng
tahsfieh-Anti-Japanese
Military-Political
College)inYena
were
arrested
revolt.
be
butreleased
said
to
were
an,
attempting
They
to
soonafterthewar againstJapanbrokeout.7'Althoughdifficult
thereportringstruebecauseit is similarto other,verifiable
verify,
to one'scommander
thatpersonalloyalty
thatdemonstrate
incidents
to moredistantsuperiors.
thanloyalty
As reis sometimes
stronger
66Liu Po-ch'eng,"Huiku ch'ang-cheng"[Reminiscingabout the Long March],
III, I2.
Hsing-huoliao-yuan,
67
68

Chungkuo kung-nung,466.
Kuo, in FCYP, March i968, II5, and IS, July i968, 46.
69See Li T'ien-huan,"Tsou-ch'uCh'ilien shan" [Marchingout of the Ch'ilien

III,
Hsing-huoliao-yiian,
mountains],

70

Hsin-Hua lihpao, April 20,

and IS, Februaryi969,
71

I938;

442.

cited by Kuo, in FCYP, November i968,

32.

Kuo, in FCYP, April i968, io8, and IS, August i968, 46-47.
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feature
thischaracteristic
centlyas i967, duringtheculturalrevolution,
societycould stillbe observed.
of a traditional
RESPITE IN NORTHERN SHENSI

Soon afterMao eliminatedChang Kuo-t'ao,anotherpotentialrival
returnedto China on a Sovietplane fromMoscow. Ch'en Shao-yii,
had been in Moscow sincethe earlythirtiesas
one of the Bolsheviks,
of the ChineseCommunistPartyand as a member
the representative
of the ExecutiveCommitteeof the Comintern.2Given his high positionsand his obviouslycloserelationswithleadersof the SovietCommunistParty,Ch'en mighthavebeen able to wrestsupremeleadership
of thePartyin theNorthernShensiarea fromMao. But he did not.
on December9 through13,
The PoliticalBureauheld a conference
1937, said to have been the largestsincethe FifthPlenumin January
againsttheJapanese
of 1934, forthepurposeof workingout a strategy
The
for the SeventhPartyCongress.73
and of making preparations
was
also electeda new leadership.Mao's growinginfluence
conference
evident.As the positionof generalsecretarywas abolished,Chang
Wen-t'ienwas reducedto being one of nine membersof the newly
The othereight memberswere Chang
formedCentralSecretariat.
Ch'en Yfin,Ch'in PangKuo-t'ao,Chang Wen-t'ien,Ch'en Shao-yfi,
hsien,Chu Te, K'ang Sheng,and Mao Tse-tung.
sponsoreda People'sPolitical
In Julyof 1938,thecentralgovernment
Council in Hankow to which the Communistswere invitedto send
delegates.Ch'en Shao-yiiwas one of the sevenleaderswho went to
Tung Pi-wu,
Hankow.74The othersix leaderswereCh'in Pang-hsien,
Chou En-lai,Lin Po-ch'fi,Teng Ying-ch'ao(Mrs. Chou En-lai), and
the leadersof the Party's
Wu Yfi-chang.The six were concurrently
Yangtze Bureau.75Ch'en later returnedto Yenan
newly-established
when Hankow was abandonedto the Japanese.
Thus, duringseveralcrucialmonths,Mao's attemptto enhancehis
withinthePartyleadershipwas aided by thetemporary
own influence
his most dangerousrival,and
potentially
absenceof Ch'en Shao-yfi,
72Kuo, in FCYP, August i968, 86, and IS, November i968, 35. Ch'en arrived in
Yenan during the last days of October,I937.
73 The congress would not be held until more than seven years later.
74 Who's Who, 7975 The China Weekly Review, Vol. 75 (July i6, i938), 238. This source was brought
to my attentionby Donald Klein. See also Who's Who, I39, 553-54,587, and 653. Unlike
the other six delegates, Chou En-lai was already in Hankow as the CCP representative
with the central government.Kuo appears to be in error when, in FCYP, September
i968, ii9, and IS, December i968, 40-4i, he lists Ch'en Shao-yfi,Ch'in Pang-hsien,Ho
K'o-ch'fian,Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying,Teng Ying-ch'ao, and Li K'o-nung.
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fromthe Central
two others,Chou En-lai,and Ch'in Pang-hsien,
had
members,
ChangWen-t'ien
Secretariat.
Of the fiveremaining
and ChangKuo-t'aohad beenreprijustbeenreducedin standing,
manded.
The historical
accidentby whichMao was the firstof the Long
toreachtheNorthern
ShensibaseareaandChangKuo-t'ao's
Marchers
in Northern
armiesweredecimated
also helpedbolsterhis prestige
number
Shensi.He alsohad nowtheadvantage
ofhavingthelargest
peaceoftroops
underhim.PerhapsofmosthelptoMao wasthefairly
after
Shensibasearea.Shortly
fulandcompact
natureoftheNorthern
ended
theSianIncident
in December
of 1936, thecentral
government
and one of the
its harassment
campaignsagainstthe Communists,
in importance
of
ofthisshift
in policywas thelessening
consequences
andthecorresponding
andhenceofmilitary
officers,
military
matters,
Put differently,
withinthe
importance
of primarily
politicalmatters.
onceagainwere
Communist
thePartyand Partyaffairs
movement,
This allowedMao to applyhisveryconsiderofprimary
importance.
of thePartyleadership
to othermembers
ablepowersof persuasion
commanders.
The
without
havingto deferto thewishesof military
Shensibaseareaprovided
forfrequent
compactness
of theNorthern
thathad not
face-to-face
contacts
amongtheleaders,an opportunity
sinceat leastthedaysofKiangsi.
existed
astutepersonaldiplomacy
and an
The recordshowsthatthrough
Mao managedto havehisideas
acutesenseofthepolitically
feasible,
translated
intopolicy.The mostcrucialquestionfortheCommunists
withtheKuoin thisrelatively
peacefulperiodwas theirrelationship
whichgavetheCommunists
EvenbeforetheSianIncident,
mintang.
andapparently
a promise
themuch-sought-after
national
attention
from
thekidnapped
againsttheJapanese,
ChiangKai-shekof cooperation
Mao Tse-tung
beganto counsela secondUnitedFrontwiththeKuotheharrowing
ordealtheLong Marchveterans
mintang.
Considering
thatMao was ableto enlist
had justgonethrough,
it was remarkable
thesupport
Thosewho
ofmostPartyleadersforhispolicysuggestion.
Ch'enShao-yfi,
didnotagree,
arguedthatthe"bloc-within"
principally
onthegrounds
UnitedFrontshouldbe adopted,
that
policyofthefirst
thanthe Communists
was incomparably
the Kuomintang
stronger
command
overall forces
be givensupreme
andthatitshould,
therefore,
of
a
"bloc
Mao's
without"
the
preproposed
policy
fighting Japanese.
ofPartyleadership
agreedwithMao thatthe
vailed,andthemajority
Communists
shouldretainsolecontrolovertheirtroopswhilecoopin a loosealliance.Ch'enShao-yfi
was
erating
withtheKuomintang
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hopeshe mayhavehad of
lostwhatever
and apparently
reprimanded
Shensi
theNorthern
within
position
Mao fromthesupreme
dislodging
basearea.
washisgrowin Mao'srisethatneedstobe mentioned
A finalfactor
ofpolicypapers.In thesamemonthinwhich
as a writer
ingreputation
Problemsof
theSian Incidentbrokeout,Mao wrotehis "Strategic
program
War,"whichwas thefirstextensive
China'sRevolutionary
China.Whenfullin Northern
encroachments
Japanese
forresisting
hisliterary
brokeoutin Julyof1937,Mao redoubled
hostilities
fledged
devoted
Mao
Yenan,
in
apartment
in hiscave
Safelyensconced
efforts.
Muchofhis
muchofhistimeduringtheeightyearsofwartowriting.
in
witha broadperspective
theCommunists
workprovided
published
ofthe
to thetotalsetting
related
wereconvincingly
whichtheirefforts
was unto thewareffort
waragainstJapan.Thismajorcontribution
and helpedraiseMao's
by manyCommunists
appreciated
doubtedly
withinthepartyleadership.
influence
which,as we
thatMao'sinfluence,
therefore,
It maywellbe argued,
theLong
between
theinterlude
during
haveseen,hadrisenappreciably
to riseduringthewar
Marchand thewar againstJapan,continued
to thatenjoyedby Stalinwithinthe Soviet
to a degreecomparable
thisassumpdoesnotsupport
evidence
The available
Communist
Party.
thesis.
an opposite
it encourages
tion;on thecontrary,
THE

WAR AGAINST JAPAN

and the war
The renewedententewiththe centralgovernment
andmay
prominence
againstJapanhelpedthePartytoregainnational
the
destruction
contend,
as someChinesespecialists
alsohaveaverted,
Shensibaseareabygovernment
troops.Butthewar
oftheNorthern
on Partyunityand,moreimportant
strains
also imposedtremendous
thatrewithinthe leadership
forthisstudy,moldedrelationships
Revolution
Cultural
intactuntiltheGreatProletarian
mainedbasically
ofthelatesixties.
aboutbytheCommunist
werebrought
leadership's
Bothconditions
linesto establish
decisionto sendmostof itstroopsbehindJapanese
baseareas,to engagethepeoplein thewar,and to conductguerrilla
major
Towardtheend of thewar,therewerefourteen
operations.
ShensibaseareawhereMao Tse-tung
baseareasbesidestheNorthern
thewar.TheywereShansiremained
throughout
andthePartyCentral
ShanShansi-Hopei-Honan-Shantung,
Shansi-Suiyiian,
Chahar-Hopei,
tung,NorthKiangsi,CentralKiangsu,SouthKiangsu,NorthHuai,
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South Huai, Central Anhui, East Chekiang, Hupei-Honan-Anhui,
Tung Chiang (the East Riverin Kwangtung),and Ch'iungYai (the
mountainousarea on Hainan Island).76
of these base areas, each having its own
The rapid proliferation
demandedan equally rapid inand mass organizations,
government
whichhad becomewhollyincreasein thesize of Partymembership,
the Party'svastlyexpandedactivsufficient
forthe taskof supervising
ities.This need as well as the strongdemand for membershipby
peopleof all walksof lifein thesebase areasresultedin the relaxation
of standardsof admission.With a nod to Marxistclass analysis,the
Partydecreedthatthe probationperiodforworkersand hiredfarm
thatforpoorpeasantsand handicraftshandsbe completely
eliminated,
minor
intellectuals,
students,
men it be one month,forrevolutionary
workers,middlepeasants,revolutionary
and white-collar
civilservants
As a result,the
soldiersthreemonths,and forall otherssix months.77
war to several
of
the
beginning
the
at
40,000
about
from
Partygrew
and continued
fewyearsoftheforties
hundredsofthousandsin thefirst
discipline,
to climbto i,200,000 at theend ofthewar.Lackingsufficient
thatthreatened
manyof thenew Partymembersengagedin activities
toucheng
totearthePartyapart.Liu Shao-ch'i,in hisessayLun tang-nei
Struggle]of I94I, complainedthatPartymembers
[On theIntra-Party
orwithout
unscrupulously
struggle
tended"to engagein theintra-Party
in
comrades
or
attack
to
befriend
procedures,
observing
organizational
an unprincipledway, provokingdissension,betrayingor secretly
schemingagainstcomrades,or notspeakingto a man'sface,butspeakthe Party,spreadcriticizing
ing wildlybehindhis back,irresponsibly
tellinglies,and calumniatrumors,
ingunfoundedopinions,circulating
The problemwas compoundedby the increasingisolaing others."78
tionof base areasfromone another.Althoughindividualscould and
did come and go frombase areas,the Japaneseblockadesbecameineffective.
creasingly
members'undermining
PartycohesiveThe dangerof ill-disciplined
nesswas viewedwithalarmby all membersof theleadership.During
campaign,formallystartedin Februaryof
the two-yearcheng-feng
in all base areas,and unsuitable
trainingwas introduced
1942, intensive
memberswere dismissed.In the headquartersbase area in Northern
severalschools
Shensi,Mao Tse-tungand thePartyCentralestablished
76 Jenmin ch'upanshe, K'ang-lih chancheng shihch'i chiehfang ch'ii kaik'uang [A
Sketchof LiberatedAreasDuring the War AgainstJapan] (Peking I953), Map i.
77 Ch'en Yfin, "How to be a good Communist
Partymember"(May 30, I939), in
BoydCompton,Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44 (SeattleI952), 96-97.
78 Brandt,
Schwartz,and Fairbank,367.
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amongParty
a commonoutlookand discipline
designedto inculcate
members
andothercadres.79
himself
as carriedoutbyMao Tse-tung
campaign,
The cheng-feng
Shensi,
had a second
headquarters
baseareain Northern
in theParty's
words,"to giveto theideoin StuartSchram's
purpose.
Mao wanted,
a specialand characteristic
of partymembers
logicalconsciousness
One resultwas
himself."80
inspired
byMao Tse-tung
qualitydirectly
forMao in theNorthShensibase area.
thebeginning
of veneration
vanity
playeda rolein it,as somespecialI do notthinkthatpersonal
istsbelieve,
to Mao'sconwas secondary
butevenifitdid,itprobably
within
of decision-making
of decentralization
cernwiththeproblem
thePartyleadership.
As thevariousbaseareasbecameincreasingly
isolatedfromoneanpowerhad to be exercisedby their
other,much decision-making
and,to a muchlesser
radiocontact
leaders.Although
politico-military
withthe PartyCentralin
extent,
couriercontactweremaintained
assumed
Northern
Partyleadershad necessarily
Shensi,theseregional
One consequence
was theshifting
of the
widepowersof discretion.
Shensito theouterbase areas.Forcedby a
initiative
fromNorthern
harshsituation
thatdid notallowleadersof thesebaseareasto wait
theregionalleaders
fromthePartyCentral,
fordetailedinstructions
andfunctions
ofpolitwithnewinstitutions
experimented
continually
ical and socialcontrolin theouterbase areas.Thesenew programs
fromthe PartyCentralrather
determined
generalpolicydirectives
thantheotherwayaround.Time and again,theleadersof theouter
andthePartyCentral
andMao Tse-tung
baseareastooktheinitiative,
For example,as
thefaiisaccomplis.
had littlechoicebutto sanction
in the
theformation
earlyas Marchof 1938, Liu Shao-ch'ireported
committee
base area of a coalitionleadership
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei
headsof
local
of
officials,
commanders,
government
composed army
of the Communist
officials
mass organizations,
Partyand of other
and
He
also
thatoccupational
reported
groupings.
politicalparties
workers,
farmers,
forbusinessmen,
"nationalsalvationassociations"
several
months
been
formed
had
earlier.8'
and students
Afterward,
suchunified
andthePartyCentralapproved
Mao Tse-tung
leadership
Committee.
Affairs
Kai-shek's
as did Chiang
Military
committees,
conferIn thatsamemonth,thePoliticalBureauheld a three-day
79These schools were the Central Party School, Yenan University,K'ang Ta, the
Lu Hsiin Academy, the Natural Science Academy, and the Central Research Institute.
80

Schram,220.

81

In my Liu Shao-ch'i and "People's War" (Lawrence, Kansas,

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 30 Oct 2014 13:02:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

I970).

THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP: CHINA

571

andpossiblemeasures
encein Yenanthatdealtwiththewarsituation
chancesof engagingthepeoplein the
theCommunists'
to improve
thePoliticalBureau"sugwar againstJapan.One of themeasures
federations.82
such
occupational
of
precisely
creation
gested"was the
and National
fortheWar ofResistance
"Program
The Kuomintang's
nationalcongressat
adoptedat its extraordinary
Development,"
identical
AprilI, I938, madevirtually
on March29 through
Wuch'ang
"suggestions."83

powerof
decision-making
degreeof autonomous
The considerable
Partyleadersin theouterbaseareaswas,on thewhole,strengthened
The rowdyand undisciin Partymembership.
bytherapidincrease
was a
by Liu Shao-ch'i,
plinednatureof manynovices,mentioned
whether
in Yenanor in theouter
ofall leaders,
totheinterests
threat
baseareas.Thus,as we haveseen,all leaderssoughttoinstilldiscipline
Buttheveryprocessofchengcampaign.
bymeansofthecheng-feng
ofstrengthening
theauthority
consequence
fenghadalsotheinevitable
Mao's
ofPartyleadersin theouterbaseareas,muchas it strengthened
and
area.
The
Shensi
base
Northern
expansion
rapid
in the
authority
intheParty's
mainly
beingcomposed
thewarresulted
during
turnover
Mostofthemdid notjoin untilaftertheoutbreak
ofnewmembers.
of loyalty,
friendship,
of thewar.Thus theirpersonalcommitments
most
to theParty
important,
and,
and trustto otherPartymembers,
in the outerbase
by theirexperiences
leaders,wereshapedentirely
areas.
character
oflifein theouterbaseareaswas miliThe predominant
ofParty
shapernotonlyoftherelations
anditwas theprincipal
tary,
itself.
to theirleaders,but also of thenatureof leadership
members
BecausemostoftheouterbaseareaswerelesssecurethantheParty's
base area in Northern
Shensi,and becausetheywere
headquarters
Japaneseand puppet
obligedto ward offthe encircling
constantly
affairs.
withmilitary
If this
troops,theirleaderswerepreoccupied
as a dangerto Partyunity,such
couldbe interpreted
preoccupation
dangersurelydid not stemfromany potentialchallengeto Party
movement
withinthe Communist
by a unitedmilitary
supremacy
ofwarlordism.
version
Throughout
norfroma Communist
command
In Eastern
forces
were
Communist
the
widelydispersed.
thewar,
China,theNew FourthArmywas led by Yeh T'ing and,afterthe
82Ch'enShao-yii,"San-yiiehchengchihchii huiyiti tsungchieh"[Summaryof the
in March],citedbyKuo in FCYP, Octoberi968, 97,and IS,
PoliticalBureauconference
i969, 41.
January
83 Kuo,

in FCYP, October i968, ioo, and IS, Januaryi969, 45.
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SouthernAnhui Incidentof Januaryof 1941, by Ch'en I, who had
been leftbehind in 1934 when the FirstFrontArmyevacuatedthe
CentralSovietArea in Kiangsi.In NorthernChina,the EighthRoute
Armywas dividedintothreedivisions,
each havingitsseparatetheater
of operations:the ii5th underLin Piao, the 120th underHo Lung,
and the 129th underLiu Po-ch'engand Hsi! Hsiang-ch'ien.84
More important,
as long-timePartymembers,the politico-military
leadersof outerbase areaswere too firmlycommittedto the idea of
Partysupremacy.
They also were not,with a few minorexceptions,
the productsof militaryacademiesand hencewere not imbuedwith
of professional
theespritde corpscharacteristic
militaryofficers.
They
were realisticenoughto know thatevenif theyhad plannedto carve
out theirpersonalwarlordpreservesafterthe war (a highlyimprobable contingency,
in my opinion), theirultimateenemy,the central
would have had littledifficulty
in defeatingthem one
government,
by one.
The potentialobstaclein the path towardcompleteunityof the
controlafterthe war
Party'sleadershipunderMao's unchallengeable
was less dramaticand lesstangible.Duringthewar againstJapan,the
leadersof each base area formedsmall cohesivegroupsthatchanged
littlein membership
duringa long period (eight years) and shared
and the lengthof time,if
extraordinary
hardships.The cohesiveness
were
in thehistoryof Chiof
the
not
degree hardship,
unprecedented
of clustersof friendship,
nese Communism.They weretheingredients
that
were
to
after
the war.
and
trust,
loyalty
persistlong
The effects
of thewar could be seen not onlyin thenaturebut also
in the compositionof the leadership.The PoliticalBureauhad probably consistedof thirteenmen in 1937. They were Chang Kuo-t'ao,
Chang Wen-t'ien,Ch'en Shao-yii,Ch'en Yiin, Ch'in Pang-hsien,
Chou
En-lai,Hsiang Ying, JenPi-shih,Li Fu-ch'un,Li Wei-han,Liu Shaoch'i, Mao Tse-tung,and Wang Chia-hsiang.All but Hsiang Ying
wereassembledin theNorthernShensibase area at theend of I937.8
When the Communistsconvenedtheir SeventhParty Congressin

Yenanbetween
April23 andJuneii,

1945,

andelectedthirteen
mem-

bers to a new PoliticalBureau,eightof its formerthirteenmembers
failedto be reelected.
Hsiang Ying had beenkilledin theSouthAnhui
84Lin Piao was not in actualcommandof the II5th Divisionduringmostof the
war. Becausehe had beenwoundedearlyin thewar,he spentsometimein theSoviet
and appearedto have residedwithMao in Yenan untilthe end
Union fortreatment
of the war.
85 Hsiang Ying had been leftbehindin the former
CentralSovietArea in Kiangsi
(see above).
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of 194i and Chang Kuo-t'aowas oustedfromthe
Incidentin January
Partyin 1938. But six othermembersof thePoliticalBureauwho were
alive and Partymembersin good standingalso failedto be included
in thenew PoliticalBureau,forone reasonor another.Ch'en Shao-yii
of
and Ch'in Pang-hsienhad been Bolsheviksand generalsecretaries
theParty.As such,theyhad beenMao's rivalsand,at times,opponents,
as shownearlierin thisstudy.They spentmostof thewar underMao's
dominationin theNorthShensibase area.At electiontimeduringthe
SeventhPartyCongress,theynot onlyfailedto remainin thePolitical
Bureau,theyjust barelymanagedto get into the CentralCommittee.
members.
out of forty-four
and forty-fourth
They rankedforty-third
AnotherBolshevik,Wang Chia-hsiang,fared even worse; he was
electedmerelyas an alternatememberof the CentralCommittee.86
memTenPi-shihand Li Fu-ch'unwereelectedas fifthand fourteenth
bersof the CentralCommittee.The last man in thisgroup,Li Weihan,failedto be electedas memberor alternatememberof theCentral
Committee.87
The eightmenwho wereaddedto thePoliticalBureauat theSeventh
PartyCongresswere Chu Te, K'ang Sheng,Lin Po-ch'ii,Lin Piao,
P'eng Chen,P'eng Te-huai,Teng Hsiao-p'ing,and Tung Pi-wu.If we
lookat theirwhereabouts
duringthewar,we discoverthatthefirstfour
spentmostof theirtimewithMao in theNorthShensibase area,and
the lastfourelsewhere.Almostall of themtravelledforshortperiods
but thisdoes not seriouslydeaway fromtheirplaces of assignment,
tractfroma remarkablebalancebetween,as it were,Yenan and nonYenan leaders.This balance cannoteasilybe dismissedas accidental,
because the entirenew PoliticalBureau was likewiseevenlydivided
intoYenan and non-Yenanleadersas follows(numbersdenoterank-

ings):88

i.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
io.

Yenan
Mao Tse-tung
Chu Te
Ch'enYfin
ChangWen-t'ien
K'ang Sheng
Lin Po-ch'ii
Lin Piao

Non-Yenan
Liu Shao-ch'i
3. Chou En-lai
9. Tung Pi-wu
ii.
P'engTe-huai
12.
P'engChen
I3. TengHsiao-p'ing
2.

He becamea fullmemberin Marchof I949.
Jhaveno adequateexplanation
declinein ranking.
precipitous
forLi's sensationally
88
Who's Who, 705. The inclusionof Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p'ingmay be erroneousbecauseit is generallybelievedthattheywere electedto the PoliticalBureau
notuntiltheFifthPlenumin Aprilof I955. However,thispossibleerrordoes notalter
thebalancebetween"Yenan" and "non-Yenan"leaders.
86

87
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Moreover,a similarbalance resultedin the five-manCentralSecretariat,whichwas composedof the leaderswith the top fiverankings
in thePoliticalBureau.
rapid and particuLiu's riseto his high rankingwas exceptionally
As we have seen,he had been a memberof thePolitlarlysignificant.
ical Bureau since beforethe Long March,but his influencewithin
thePartyleadershipon theeve of thewar againstJapanwas undoubtedly less than thatof Mao Tse-tung,Chou En-lai,or even Chu Te.
Liu had spentmostof the war behindenemylinesin his capacityas
be
leader of all Communistsin "White" areas. He may, therefore,
Party
the
of
Mao
in
charge
with
looked upon as Mao's counterpart,
areas.Inasmuchas most
Centraland Liu in chargeoftheJapanese-held
areas,theyhad
by theJapanese-held
outerbase areasweresurrounded
close contactwith Communistundergroundorganizationsthere.It
and
hundredsof suchorganizations
was Liu Shao-ch'iwho supervised
who appointedtheirleaders,manyof whom would laterriseto high
positionsin theParty.Becauseof therelationsbetweenouterbase areas
areas and of Liu's work,he probablyalso had conand Japanese-held
siderableinfluencein the outerbase areas.Thus, by the time of the
SeventhPartyCongress,Liu had becomethe top spokesmanfor the
organizaouterbase areasas well as forthe Communistunderground
areas.
tionsin Japanese-held
of the new leadership,as expressedin thebalance
The composition
pointed to the
in the PoliticalBureau and the CentralSecretariat,
as these tasks
period,
in
the
the
postwar
of
Party
tasks
paramount
adopted
bytheleadershipitself.The PartyConstitution,
wereperceived
at the SeventhPartyCongress,announcedthe beginningof an "antiof themassesunder
revolution
new-democratic
anti-feudal,
imperialist,
mosturgenttask
the
in
which
Party's
the
proletariat"
theleadershipof
was to "organizeand unifytheChineseworkers,peasants,pettybourelements
and anti-feudal
and all anti-imperialist
geoisie,intelligentsia,
on its side." This was a tall order.Although
and nationalminorities
the Partyhad grownstrongduringthe War and had an estimated
ninetymillionpeopleundercontrolin itsmanybase areas,theultimate
stronger.
to be incomparably
enemy-thecentralgovernment-seemed
of
little
was
there
getting
that
warned
hope
Constitution
The Party
importantto
back to thecitiessoon and that"it will be preeminently
basesand it will also be necesconsolidatethevillagesas revolutionary
of patientwork among
a
to
period
long
the
undergo
for
Party
sary
fortheultimate
In otherwords,thepreparations
thepopularmasses."89
89

and Fairbank,422-23.
Brandt,Schwartz,
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struggle
withthecentral
government
hadtobe madeprecisely
in those
areasand in thosetechniques
of whichtheleadersof theouterbase
areas,and preeminently
Liu Shao-ch'i,
had accumulated
an intimate
knowledge.
Liu Shao-ch'i
andtheother"non-Yenan"
leadersalsohad
theloyalty
of thousands
of Communist
underground
cadresin those
areas.The Partyneededtheseassetsbadlyif it wereto win outover
thecentral
government.
On theotherhand,Mao Tse-tung
possessed
neither
theknowledge
of conditions
in Northern
and EasternChinanor thepersonalties
withtheCommunist
cadresthere.Buthe suppliedanother
mostimportantingredient
forvictory,
namely,himselfas the symbolof a
purposeful,
united,and invincible
party.By callinghim a symbol,
He did nothave
I do notwishto implythatMao had no influence.
hisownmilitary
units,as theleadersof outerbaseareashad,buthe
in the headquarters
area of Northern
did enjoyunrivaled
prestige
as symbollayin thefactthatin therelative
Shensi.His contribution
in Yenan,Mao had written
ofhis caveapartment
several
tranquility

in 1937, Chungmajoressays,suchas Maotunlun [On Contradiction]
kuo komingho Chungkuokungch'antang[The ChineseRevolution
and the ChineseCommunistParty]in I939, and Hsin minchu-chuyi
lun [On The New Democracy]in 1940.90

theclaimmadebythePartyConThesewritings
helpedtosupport
that"theChineseComstitution
adopted
bytheSeventh
PartyCongress
ofMarxism-Leninism
and theunified
munist
Partytakesthetheories
the
Chinese
of
thethought
ofthepractice
ofMao
thought
revolution,
as theguideline
forall ofitsactions."91
Thisboldstatement
Tse-tung,
Mao on a parwithMarxandLeningrewnotfromtheleaders'
putting
ofMao as a greattheoretician
or as theunchallengeacknowledgment
ableleaderof theParty,butfromtheirbeliefthatsuchelevation
of
causein the impending
Mao wouldhelp the Communist
struggle
The primary
withthecentralgovernment.
purposeof exaltingMao
in thehistory
of ChineseCommunism
at thiscriticaljuncture
was
theChinesepeoplethatin thecontest
betweentheComto convince
Mao was a moredeserving
and thenationalists,
munists
leaderthan
To thesmallbutpolitically
was ChiangKai-shek.
highlyimportant
and commercial
Mao waspresented
urbanintellectual,
political,
elites,
Chineseideology
thatpromised
as theshaperofa bynowthoroughly
90 Mao was a most prolificwriter during the war. Two entire volumes of the fourvolume Mao Tse-tung hsiUanchi[Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung] (Peking i964) contain sixty-sixselectionssaid to have been writtenbetween Julyof I937 and the Seventh
Party Congress in April of I945.
91 Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 422.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 30 Oct 2014 13:02:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

576

WORLD POLITICS

society
andthehopeof a dynamic
ofa well-ordered
boththecomfort
to themoretradition-bound
people,especially
future.
To thecommon
the
of becoming
as a man worthy
olderpeople,Mao was presented
betweenheaven
new "king"who had theabilityto createharmony
andearth.
of theSeventhPartyCongresswas
In sum,thechiefsignificance
It wasan alliancebetween
thecoalition
natureofthePartyleadership.
and theleadersof the
of the"waveof thefuture,"
Mao, thesymbol
whowiththeirmilitary
Liu Shao-ch'i,
outerbaseareas,andespecially
know-how
wereto make
forcesand theirpoliticaland organizational
this"wave"a reality.
CONCLUSIONS

characteristic
This studyhas attempted
to showthattheprincipal
movement
between1930 and 1945was the
oftheChineseCommunist
Onlyfrom
control
in thePartyand themilitary.
lackof centralized
of I937 was thereindisputably
the end of 1936 to aboutSeptember
Before1936,Partyleaders
control
overthesetwoorganizations.
unified
werecommanding
theirown troopsand theirown base areas.The
andPeasChineseWorkers'
undertheso-called
troops
weresubsumed
commanded
by
ants'RedArmy,
andthebaseareasweretheoretically
however,
theCentralBureaufortheSovietAreas.Bothorganizations,
over
in thesensethattheyhad no actualcontrol
werelargely
illusory
all troopsand all baseareas.As we haveseen,theCentralBureaufor
control
overtheCentralSovietAreain
theSovietAreashad sufficient
Southern
Kiangsito expelfromthePartytheleadersof theFut'ien
thatthisbureauinfluenced
rebellion.
Thereis no evidence,
however,
thepointtheleadersofthosebaseareasdeemed
otherbaseareasbeyond
and
theheadquarters
of theChineseWorkers'
Likewise,
appropriate.
overtheFirstFrontArmy
Peasants'Red Armyhad actualcommand
derived
tothatarmy.Thiscommand
wholly
so longas itwasattached
and
commander
commissar
political
fromthe factthatthe army's
holdingthesamepostsin theFirstFrontArmy.
wereconcurrently
did not extendto
actualauthority
The sphereof theheadquarters'
thetwootherfrontarmiesnorperhapsevento thesmallermilitary
China.WhenaftertheMaoerhkai
Southern
unitsscattered
throughout
to the FourthFront
was transferred
the headquarters
Conference
becauseChangKuoceasedaltogether,
probably
Army,itsinfluence
to accept
was
unlikely
unit,
t'ao,as theleaderof thelargestmilitary
fromanyone.
orders
forthelack of
accounted
factors
Two majorimmediate
probably
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centralized
controlin boththePartyand themilitary.
One was the
geographical
dispersal
of leadersand theotherwas thelack of consensusamongthemon severalpoliticaland military
issues.A more
fundamental
factor
strengthening
theeffects
ofgeographical
dispersal
andsharpening
thedivisions
ofopinionwaswhatI callthetraditionalisticsyndrome.
werea particularistic
Itsmaincomponents
world-view,
personalized
and ascriptive
organizational
transactions,
personnel
criteria.
As in
in ruralChina of the thirties
manyothertraditional
societies,
and
was restricted
forties
a man'sworld-view
to a fairlysmallgeographical spherewherehe came intofrequent
face-to-face
contacts
with
thoseto whomhe was boundby friendship,
loyalty,
responsibility,
Theserelations
weretypically
obligation,
love,or someotherrelation.
like
the
the
local
on
focused organizations
thefamily
village,
district,
theschool,or somelocalpeasantor handi(conjugaland extended),
craft
association.
had beenverymuchweakenedin
world-view
This particularistic
thecitiesbuteventhereitalwaysremained
strong
enoughtoinfluence
an organization
The morepersonalized
transactions.
organizational
were.To putit concretely,
itstransactions
in
was,themoreefficient
suchas thecentral
national
organizations
government,
political
parties,
relations
morethan
tradeunions,and thelike,it was particularistic
codesofbureaucratic
ora common
theimpersonal
hierarchy
allegiance
thatdetermined
thedegreeofcohesionof
to someabstract
principles
theseorganizations.
and itsarmedforces,
itsgovernment,
The Kuomintang,
likeother
this phenomenon.
nationalorganizations,
exemplified
Throughout
factions
thatweredetermined
theperiodunderconsideration,
byparfactorsoperatedwithinthe larger,impersonal
ticularistic
national
The so-calledC. C. clique,theKwangsigenerals,
and
organizations.
arethreeoutofinnumerable
LiketheWhampoagraduates
examples.
and demotednotso much
wise,peoplewerehired,fired,
promoted,
butonthebasisofmembership
criteria
ofmerit
totheformal
according
in one or severalparticularistic
groups.The presenceand influence
in thethirties
and forties
aretoowell
ofthetraditionalistic
syndrome
calledintoquestion.
knowntobe seriously
theleadersoftheChineseCommuis whether
The crucialquestion
in thissociety,
couldhaveennistParty,
born,raised,and operating
ofthetraditionalistic
The
tirely
escapedfromtheinfluences
syndrome.
no. The ChineseCommunists
answermustbe,I think,an emphatic
fromthesocietalinfluences
that
couldnothavewilleda totaldivorce
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and actions.
Theyalso
had beencontinuously
shapingtheirthoughts
offfromtheseinfluences
becouldnothavewishedto cutthemselves
victory
intimately
decausethechancesfortheirsuccessand ultimate
withthesociety
at large.In
pendedon an almostsymbiotic
relation
guerrilla
principle
was notmerely
a
otherwords,the"fish-in-water"
stratagem.
military
tacticbuta sociopolitical
leadership,
as espousedbymany
Yet theimageofa quasi-collective
relation.
Chinaspecialists,
in effect
deniessucha naturalandnecessary
It positsthatwhilethetraditionalistic
syndrome
continued
toinfluence
all otherpolitical
in thecountry,
itplayedno significant
organizations
leadership.
On thecontrary,
theimage
partin thenatureoftheParty's
similarto thoseof highlybureauca leadership
portrays
remarkably
Hereis theperfectly
ratizedcountries.
pyramidal
hierarchy,
so familiar
tous in NorthAmerica,
Japan,and Europe,and thedelightof every
a partyfighting
student
of publicadministration,
governing
forsurof China.We aretold,without
anyhardevivivalin thebackwoods
dence,thatsometimebetween1930 and 1945,one man,Mao Tse-tung,

leaderof theentireComwas actuallythesoleand unchallengeable
munistParty.The wordof thisleaderof thePartysinceTsunyialand possibly
Hard evidence
correct
legedlywas accepted
byeveryone.
havenotalteredthisimage.To citeonly
to thecontrary
suggestions
at Maoerhkaito prevailoverChang
Mao's inability
two examples,
ofmajorpoliciesdurthaninitiating
rather
Kuo-t'aoandhisratifying
on theidea thatMao has
ing thewarhavehad no remedialeffect
beentheleadersinceTsunyi.
thattheimageof a
I hopethatthisbriefstudyhas demonstrated
is seriously
flawed.
First,it restsheavilyon
quasi-collective
leadership
thatis notbackedup by
of theTsunyiConference
an interpretation
of the sourcesusedby
As I have shown,an examination
evidence.
his interJerome
Ch'en,theonlypersonwho has soughtto support
of substance.
revealsnothing
of thatconference,
Second,it
pretation
ofthenatureofleaderships
appearstobe influenced
byourknowledge
theChifromthosesurrounding
different
in societalcontexts
sharply
thestrong
between1930 and 1945. Third,it ignores
neseCommunists
influenced
thattheleadersweresignificantly
bythetradiprobability
in whichtheyoperated.
ofthesociety
tionalistic
syndrome
were
leaders
thattheParty's
nooneisapttoargueseriously
Ofcourse,
as weretherusticdenizensof
influenced
as strongly
bythissyndrome
Shensi.The leadersprofessed
Southern
hostility
Kiangsior Northern
as themostmodernized
andsaw themselves
to tradition
politicalelite
butthisis notthesameas sayin China.Theymayhavebeenright,
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fromtheirtraditional
ing thattheyhad in factescapedcompletely
and environment.
background
collective
as genuinely
This studyhas viewedthePartyleadership
equal influence
had roughly
in thesensethatseveralofitsmembers
is basedon the
leadership
Thisviewofa collective
in theentire
Party.
had beenan important
syndrome
thatthetraditionalistic
conviction
between1930 and
of thenatureof thePartyleadership
determinant
in
presented
of thematerial
thata briefrecapitulation
1945. I believe
thisinterpretation.
willconfirm
thisstudy
inMoscow.This
closetiesas schoolmates
hadformed
The Bolsheviks
tiestoPavelMif,
bytheirpersonal
bondwasreinforced
particularistic
tripto China,
in Moscowand guardianon theirreturn
theirmentor
to
placeduponthembytheComintern
bythemandate
andsustained
task
had
to
be
difficult
This
exceedingly
the
party.
seizecontrolof
in a piecemealmannerbecausethePartywas geographiundertaken
first
concentrated
on taking
therefore,
The Bolsheviks,
callydispersed.
the
such as the CentralCommittee,
overthe centralorganizations
all of whichwerelocatedin
PoliticalBureau,and the Secretariat,
thistaskbyI93I.
theyaccomplished
at thetime.Essentially,
Shanghai
oftheentire
thede factocontrol
couldhavecaptured
The Bolsheviks
a
modern
had
been
the
time
organization,
the
same
Party
Partyat
if
can generally
expectto
of a modernorganization
sinceleadership
andcarried
outina routine
fashion
andorders
accepted
haveitspolicies
BecausetheChiof geographical
dispersal.
regardless
byall members
geographical
Partywas nota modernorganization,
neseCommunist
their
fromautomatically
theBolsheviks
extending
didprevent
dispersal
fromthePartyCentralto thevariousbaseareas.
authority
in
relationships
ofparticularistic
was thegrowth
A secondobstacle
The leadersof theCentralSovietAreaand
thebaseareathemselves.
baseareashad
andHupei-Honan-Anhui
Hunan-Hupei
oftheWestern
andbasearealeaders,
all ofwhom,Bolsheviks
owngroups
their
formed
In other
to theirrevolution.
sharedan ideologyand a commitment
that
to abstractions
a commitment
contained
words,theirworld-view
But all of themwere,to variousdedistances.
bridgedgeographical
bonds
Theirparticularistic
ofa traditional
society.
grees,stillproducts
of extreme
and friendship,
forgedunderconditions
of loyalty,
trust,
in closegroupsof leadersin each base area,
dangerand hardships
to extendfrom
provedtoo strongto allowa commoncommitment
control.As we have seen,the sphereof
to centralized
abstractions
of
suchas the headquarters
actualcontrolof smallerorganizations,
Bureau
RedArmyandtheCentral
andPeasants'
Workers'
theChinese
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fortheSovietAreas,likewisedid notextendbeyondthegroupsto
whichtheywereattached.
as I thinkit was,
was responsible,
syndrome
If thetraditionalistic
controlduringtheKiangsiperiod,it was
forthelackof centralized
evenmoreso duringtheLong Marchesbecausemorethaneverthe
and each
groupswereisolatedfromone another
severalCommunist
As theagendaof
and hardships.
wasfacingon itsowngravedangers
shows,theleadersof theFirstFrontArmy
theTsunyiConference
butonlyconproblems
idealsnorParty-wide
did notdiscussabstract
facingthemalone.
problems
cretepoliticaland military
synof thepowerof thetraditionalistic
manifestation
The clearest
Had
Conferences.
andMaoerhkai
at theLianghok'ou
dromeoccurred
in which,interalia,one man
thePartybeena modernorganization
and unchallengeable
had, by virtueof his formalrank,undisputed
underMao towards
wouldhavemarched
armies
thetwofront
control,
Shensi.Theydid notbecausetwogroupsfacedeachother
Northern
than
bondswithineach groupprovedstronger
whoseparticularistic
ideals.
toabstract
thecommoncommitment
betweentheLong Marchesand thewar against
The briefrespite
timebetweenI930 and I945 whenmostParty
only
the
Japanwas
peacefulcondiin one placeunderrelatively
leaderswereassembled
timespeakcontions.It was duringthistimethatwe canforthefirst
Shensi.
in thebase areain Northern
of Mao'spre-eminence
fidently
Snow's
of
which
Edgar
accounts,
journalistic
Variouscontemporaneous
projected
Red StarOverChinahas beenbyfarthemostinfluential,
I thinkthat,on thewhole,
leadership.
an imageof a quasi-collective
in I936 andI937.
oftheleadership
description
sucha termisan accurate
becamecollectheleadership
Withtheonsetof thewar,however,
tiveonceagain.As thisstudyhas shown,withinthewidelydispersed
As the
oflaborslowlyemerged.
a roughdivision
leadership,
collective
tomore
directed
and
more
was
warworeon,thisdivisionof labor
againstthecentral
struggle
wardthepostwar
periodandtheultimate
Mao Tsein Northern
Shensi,
headquarters
In theParty's
government.
that
essays
and
theoretical
of
a series policypapers
tungformulated
leadermadeby theentireParty
thebasisforthestatement,
formed
were
in I945, thattheCommunists
PartyCongress
shipat theSeventh
internal
toward
to
lead
China
the
than
Nationalists
betterqualified
that
This does not mean,however,
unityand externalsovereignty.
leaderof the
Mao had in factbecomethe singleunchallengeable
whohad
The leadersoftheouterbaseareasandLiu Shao-ch'i,
Party.
in
Partyinfrastructure
an underground
beenin chargeof creating
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the "White" areas,had both the militarypower and the politicoorganizationalskill in Northernand EasternChina withoutwhich
as supreme
thePartycouldnothope to replacethecentralgovernment
rulerof China.It is unlikelythatMao had actuallyascendedto a preeminentpositionof influencein the Partyduringthe war becauseof
of Mao, Liu, and the leaders of the
the essentialinterdependence
Liu
outerbases.It is also unlikelybecause,as thisstudyhas suggested,
and the outer-baseleadershad become the nuclei of strongparticularisticbonds. The resultwas a finebalance,firmlygroundedin a
commonideologyand directedagainsta common enemy,between
Mao Tse-tungand his groupin Yenan, on one hand, and Liu Shaoch'i and the leadersin outerbase areas and elsewhere,on the other
hand.
pySome Westernscholars,accustomedto dealing with perfectly
nature of a truly
may find the indeterminate
ramidal hierarchies,
But if thisstudyhas
collectiveleadershipunnaturalor uncomfortable.
that duringthe formative
achievedits purpose,it has demonstrated
periodfromI930 to I945, theParty'sleadershipwas in factcollective.
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